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 Objectives. Metacognitive deficits are thought to be closely related to functional 
impairment in a variety of mental health disorders. Understanding metacognitive differences 
between groups may provide insight into etiology and treatment of mental illness. This study 
sought to investigate group differences in metacognition and metacognitive changes over time in 
response to long-term psychodynamic psychotherapy amidst a population with severe mental 
illness diagnoses, specifically borderline personality disorder (BPD), narcissistic personality 
disorder (NPD), and schizoid personality disorder (SPD). 
 Methods. Twenty-eight participants meeting inclusion criteria were selected from 
amongst participants in the Austen Riggs Center’s (ARC) 11-year Follow-Along Study (FAS). 
For each participant, two archived transcripts of Dynamic Interviews administered at least six 
months apart were rated using the abbreviated Metacognitive Assessment Scale (MAS-a), which 
provides scores for metacognitive functioning across four separate but interdependent domains 
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of functioning. Raters had experience and training on the MAS-a and were blinded to personality 
disorder group assignment of the FAS participants. Group differences and change over time were 
assessed using a general linear model regression with metacognitive scores for occasion one as a 
covariate and scores for occasion two as the dependent variable.  
 Results. Metacognitive scores improved over time in response to treatment for the 
sample as a whole. Treatment effect sizes were medium to large. However, group differences 
were negligible. Effect sizes for individual groups indicate possible differences in the way that 
groups change over time. NPD group exhibited no change in Awareness of Others, but had a 
large effect size in the category of Mastery. Large effect sizes in the category of Self-Reflectivity 
were found for SPD and BPD groups. BPD demonstrated lower Mastery scores than NPD or 
SPD.  
 Conclusions. Evidence for metacognitive improvement over time for the sample as a 
whole suggests treatment at ARC is effective. Differences in effect sizes in change over time 
between groups may suggest that personality disorder diagnosis influences treatment outcomes, a 
hypothesis that may be more readily testable with a larger sample. Generalizability of results is 
limited by the relatively small size of sample subgroups and by the unique patient population and 
unique treatment setting of ARC.   
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Treating individuals with severe mental illness—specifically severe personality 
disorders—has always been a complicated endeavor. Those who meet criteria for diagnosis 
seldom respond well to medication, they find it difficult to access services, and are often 
stigmatized and socially rejected. Their lives are marked by a poorly integrated sense of self, a 
lack of ego strength, and chronically tumultuous interpersonal relationships. Individuals with 
personality disorders, in general, have difficulty problem solving; communicating and 
advocating for their needs and desires; accessing social support; finding satisfaction in work, 
love, and play; and even understanding the nature of their illness. From a treatment perspective, 
personality disorders create unique problems for therapists, who must learn to connect with and 
build a strong therapeutic alliance with individuals who struggle to do just that.  Personality 
disorders also exhibit higher comorbidity than traditional Axis I disorders (Clark, 2005; Clark, 
2007), complicating treatment all the more.  
Numerous studies over the last several decades substantiate the efficacy of psychotherapy 
for personality disorders (Bateman, Campbell, Luyten, & Fonagy, 2018; Cristea et al., 2017; 
Dimaggio et al., 2017; Shedler, 2010). However, the majority of these studies (for notable 
exceptions, see Arnevik et al, 2009; Bamelis, Evers, Spinhoven, & Arntz, 2014; Budge et al., 
2013; Kramer, Pascural-Leone, Rohde, & Sachse,, 2016; Muran, Safran, Samstag, & Winston, 
2005) have focused primarily on treating borderline personality disorder (BPD; Gask, Evans, & 
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Kessler, 2013), and evidence suggests there are stark differences between BPD and other PDs. 
For example, in contrast to classic BPD symptoms of impulsivity, emotional dysregulation, 
chaotic interpersonal relations, and poor distress tolerance (MacKinnon, Michels, & Buckley, 
2016), obsessive-compulsive, avoidant, paranoid, and dependent personality disorders are 
notable for overregulation of emotion (Lynch & Cheavens, 2008; Lynch, Hempel, & Clark, 
2016), inhibition of affect (Popolo et al., 2014), and avoidance of social contact (Dimaggio et al., 
2017).  
While Narcissistic Personality Disorder (NPD) overlaps with BPD in terms of emotional 
dysregulation (Maples et al., 2010), such dysregulation is thought to arise for different reasons 
and from different core pathologies (Akhtar, 1987; Kernberg, 1967; Kernberg, 1970; Kernberg, 
1975; Mitchell & Black, 1995). Elements of self-pathology are frequently expressed differently 
in NPD as well, with NPD individuals exhibiting perfectionistic standards, remaining 
interpersonally distant and aloof (Ronningstam & Weinberg, 2013), and eliciting different 
countertransference reactions from therapists than those with BPD (Colli, Tanzilli, Dimaggio, & 
Lingiardi, 2014; Dimaggio et al., 2017). Generalizability of the evidence-base for treatment of 
BPD is therefore limited, and there is a need for a greater understanding of what works for whom 
when it comes to treating personality disorders. Additionally, while the efficacy of treatment for 
BPD is now well substantiated, little is known about the mechanism of change in the course of 
therapy. Patients improve in specialized treatments such as Dialectical Behavioral Therapy 
(DBT), Mentalization-based Treatment (MBT), and Transference-focused Psychotherapy (TFP), 
but they also improve in treatment as usual comparison groups (Bateman et al., 2018). Further 
research is needed.  
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Psychoanalysis has a long history of treating personality-disordered individuals (Fonagy, 
1991; Kernberg, 1975; Kohut, 1971) and has developed robust and useful theories for 
understanding such disorders and their differences. However, the use of psychoanalysis in cases 
of severe mental illness (SMI)—psychosis, more severe personality disorders—has remained 
controversial despite empirical support (Chiesa, Fonagy, & Holmes, 2003), with many 
questioning whether those with SMI have the capacity for insight and ego strength needed to 
tolerate the anxiety, intimacy, and intensity associated with psychoanalysis. Dialectical 
Behavioral Therapy (DBT; Linehan, 1993)—a behaviorally focused and highly regimented 
manualized treatment program also originally designed for BPD—is often recommended as the 
“gold standard” of personality disorder treatment in lieu of psychoanalysis. Additionally, the 
psychoanalytic mode of treatment—often individual therapy multiple times a week over the 
course of years—creates methodological problems for empirically studying the nature 
personality disorders and measuring outcomes, and is often thought to be cost-prohibitive for 
many individuals.  
Diagnosis of personality disorders remains controversial as well. High comorbidity and 
within-diagnosis heterogeneity between disorders, marked temporal instability, the lack of clear 
boundaries between normal and pathological personality, and poor convergent and discriminant 
validity for diagnostic categories, all undermine diagnostic reliability with regard to both the 4th 
(American Psychiatric Association [APA], 2000) and 5th (APA, 2013) editions of the Diagnostic 
and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (Bateman et al., 2018; Skodol et al., 2011;). Within 
the psychoanalytic literature on personality disorders, matters are complicated in that the term 
borderline personality organization is a descriptor used to describe a level of functioning and 
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intrapsychic structure for multiple disorders (Kernberg, 1970; Kernberg, 1984), while Borderline 
Personality Disorder now refers to a discrete personality disorder (Gunderson, 1982, Hamilton, 
1996; Hamilton et al., 1984; Kernberg et al., 1981). Additionally, recent findings by Sharp et al. 
(2015) support the idea of a general psychopathology “p” factor underlying all personality 
disorders, but with various personality disorders showing additional loading onto specific “s” 
factors. Interestingly, BPD loads most significantly onto this “p” factor, but fails to load onto any 
of the other “s” factors. Again, this highlights the lack of generalizability between BPD and other 
personality disorders, as well as the convoluted nature of the present diagnostic system.  
Metacognition  
One promising but lesser known pathway for understanding and treating personality 
disorders, and for providing clinicians with a way to measure and monitor change over the 
course of psychotherapy, even in psychoanalysis, is through the theoretical and empirical study 
of metacognition (Dimaggio & Lysaker, 2010; Semerari et al, 2003;). Broadly speaking, 
metacognition refers to “a thought about a thought”. More specifically, Lysaker and Klion 
(2016) define metacognition as “a mental act in which a person forms a thought or an idea about 
his or her own or another’s mental activities” (p. 17). Related to but different from similar terms 
such as mentalization (Fonagy & Bateman, 2006) and social cognition, metacognition is more 
than simply just thinking about one’s own or another’s thoughts, but includes processes by which 
individuals use these abilities to problem solve and to cope with mental distress (Lysaker & 
Klion, 2016; Semerari et al., 2003). Metacognition is thought to play a critical role in human 
relationships and adaptive human functioning (Fodor, 1983, Lysaker & Klion, 2016), and 
problems with metacognition are thought to be equally important in the psychopathology of 
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severe mental illness (DiMaggio & Lysaker, 2010). Through a metacognitive lens, symptoms 
associated with personality disorders can be conceptualized as related to impairment in one’s 
capacity to think about one’s own thoughts about oneself, about the actions and intentions of 
others, and about one’s place in the world; and impairment in using these thoughts about 
thoughts to reach one’s goals and overcome psychosocial difficulties.  
Metacognitive Impairments in SMI populations. Metacognitive impairments have 
been observed across the spectrum of SMI—including within personality disordered individuals 
(Dimaggio & Lysaker, 2010)—and manifest in a variety of ways. Individuals with SMI may 
struggle making sense of their own thoughts and feelings. It may be difficult for them to imagine 
the mind of another—a key component of empathy/emotional intelligence/social cognition—and 
to make plausible guesses about how someone is feeling or what someone else is thinking. One 
person may not be able to put words to feelings, while another may have trouble labeling or 
distinguishing between emotions and affective states in nuanced ways. Other persons may 
struggle to make sense of, interpret, or become aware of the intentions of those around them. It 
may be difficult to infer intentions from action, and one may have difficulty comprehending how 
his or her actions affect others (Dimaggio & Lysaker, 2010). It may be hard to imagine others 
with independent motives and goals, and some individuals may not even think about the feelings, 
thoughts, or intentions of others, let alone themselves.  
Problems associated with Metacognitive Impairments. One can imagine the problems 
that might arise when someone is unable to think effectively about their own or others’ thoughts 
and ideas. Dimaggio and Lysaker (2010) noted metacognitively impaired individuals are often 
unable to recognize subtle emotional and behavioral cues in others—and in themselves—and 
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respond in a prosocial manner; their ability form meaningful relationships is severely limited. 
They struggle to recognize the nature of their difficulties and seek out support and, with limited 
reflective capacity, they are often unable to find meaning and satisfaction in work, love, and 
leisure. They additionally note individuals with metacognitive impairment not only struggle with 
discrete metacognitive abilities, as noted above, but they often struggle with integrating their 
thoughts into a coherent narrative about themselves and others. Like puzzle pieces that just will 
not fit together, they cannot integrate thoughts, feelings, and perceptions into effective problem-
solving strategies.  As multiple studies outlined in the pages that follow suggest, difficulties in 
these areas can be accompanied by severe psychopathology (Perris & Skagerlind, 1998) and 
indeed may even contribute to the development of severe mental illness (Dimaggio & Lysaker, 
2010). 
Metacognition, Personality Disorders, and Psychoanalysis -The Current Study 
 Understanding personality dysfunction in terms of metacognitive impairment creates a 
unique opportunity to better understand both the nature of severe personality disorders and their 
treatment. Especially as it pertains to the psychoanalytic treatment of personality disorders, 
metacognition provides a useful bridge between difficult-to-measure theoretical ideas about the 
inner workings of the personality disordered mind, treatment methodology and focus, and 
manifest symptoms that are often chaotic and destructive (Yang, Coid, & Tyrer, 2010). Building 
on this unique synergy, this study seeks to use the concept of metacognition and a metacognitive 
assessment tool to measure treatment outcomes for personality disorders in a psychoanalytic 
treatment community and also to attempt to better understand unique metacognitive differences 
between different personality disorders in the same setting. The following sections outline the 
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historical development of the concept of metacognition, provide a working definition of 
metacognition, and compare and contrast it with similar but different concepts. Contemporary 
findings in metacognition research and innovative treatment modalities are then highlighted, and 
the limitations of measuring metacognition will be explored. Next, the metacognition assessment 
scale MAS and its successor, the abbreviated metacognition assessment scale (MAS-a), will be 
described in detail, followed by an outline of how we used the scale in order to attempt to 
examine metacognitive differences and changes over time in a population with severe mental 
illness—specifically individuals with either borderline personality disorder, narcissistic 
personality disorder, or schizoid personality disorder—at the Austen Riggs Center, a long-term 
inpatient psychoanalytic psychiatric hospital.  
Historical Development of Metacognition 
Although the study of metacognition officially began in the late 1970s and early 1980s, 
previous research had already begun examining the ways in which individuals think about their 
own thoughts. Social psychology research on cognitive dissonance and self-attribution 
demonstrated our predisposition to attribute meaning to our experiences (Bem, 1967; Schachter 
& Singer, 1962), and through close observation of children, specifically through False Belief 
experiments, developmental psychologists have similarly inferred that the growth of mental 
processes throughout childhood allow young people to formulate and modify expectations and 
beliefs about the minds of one another (Astington & Baird, 2005; Wimmer & Perner, 1983; 
Wellman, Cross, & Watson, 2001).  
Early formulations of metacognitive theory and the emerging hypothesis that 
metacognition plays a central role in mental illness were also supported by autism research. For 
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example, using a false-belief study, Baron-Cohen, Leslie, and Frith (1985) observed significantly 
worse performance in a group of autistic children than in a control group of children with 
Down’s syndrome when tasked with guessing where a doll would look for a ball that had been 
moved when the doll was not present. The researchers hypothesized that individuals with autism 
may lack an ability to form theories about what might be transpiring in the minds of others 
(Theory of Mind). They proposed that such deficits could contribute to explaining the difficulties 
autistic children experience with interpersonal connection and socialization. Contemporary 
theorists (Sharp, Croudace, & Goodyer, 2007) similarly argue that biases and or distortions in the 
way individuals make sense of their social environment may impair pro-social development and 
may compromise mental health and maintain or result in emotional and behavioral disturbances. 
Metacognition research advanced significantly as divergent branches of research 
including education, the cognitive sciences, and developmental psychology began to understand 
that mental processes involve more than just taking in information and problem solving, they 
involve reflecting on those thoughts and feelings and bits of information in such a way that the 
individual is able to make meaning of his or her experience (Dimaggio & Lysaker, 2010; Flavell, 
1979). Furthermore, metacognitive researchers theorized that through metacognitive processes—
forming mental representations of self and others, considering and making sense of one’s own 
feelings and emotions, and caring deeply about and trying to ascertain the desires and intentions 
of others—individuals create mental models and develop processes that inform and guide 
thoughts, feelings, and behaviors, and that influence conceptualizations of self and others 
(Dimaggio & Lysaker, 2010; Fodor, 1983).  
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In the 1990s and early 2000s, researchers began exploring the role of metacognition in 
serious mental disorders among adults. Stiles and colleagues (1990) noted deficiencies in 
awareness of disturbing thoughts and limited abilities to label emotions in people with depressive 
disorders. Stiles and colleagues also reported increased efficacy in coping with thoughts and 
feelings as those patients became more aware of their problematic mental states. Based on his 
own experiences with individuals with borderline personality disorder, Fonagy (1991) 
hypothesized that deficits in metacognitive functioning may reflect not only developmental 
impairment but an implicit interpersonal defensive strategy that emerged in threatening social 
environments. Additionally, Firth (1992) hypothesized that difficulty recognizing and making 
sense of one’s own mental states and the mental states of others was a stable, central feature in 
schizophrenia. 
Metacognition Defined 
Attempting to bring clarity and some degree of organization to ideas about 
metacognition, Semerari (1999) conceptualized metacognitive processes as a metacognitive 
system, with a set of functions that work both separately or together and can similarly be 
impaired separately or as a whole. Semerari and colleagues (2003) described three main 
categories of metacognition, namely awareness of self, awareness of the mind of another, and 
mastery, or the ability to use effective strategies to cope with relational and psychological 
distress. In time, Lysaker, Buck, and Hamm (2015) added the ability to see that others have 
separate lives with their own independent motives and equally valid perspectives as a key 
metacognitive ability termed decentration. They integrated decentration with Semerari’s three 
categories into their theoretical formulation of metacognition and into a formal assessment tool, 
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to be described later in this paper. Both Semerari (1999) and Lysaker, Buck, et al. (2015) 
proposed these processes as interrelated, overlapping, and consistently interacting, enhancing or 
limiting social adaption and problem solving (Dimaggio, Lysaker, Carcione, Nicolo, & Semerari, 
2008).  
Dimaggio and Lysaker (2010) recognize the overlap between metacognition and other 
related concepts such as social cognition (which includes the concept of theory of mind 
developed by Premack & Woodruff, 1978), mentalization, and mindfulness and emotional 
intelligence.  Important differences are noted, however. Both social cognition and metacognition 
focus on the way in which people form ideas about social exchanges (Davis et al., 2016; 
Pinkham et al., 2014), but metacognition is less concerned with accuracy of a person’s ideas than 
with the complexity, adaptiveness, and flexibility of mental representations (Davis et al., 2016). 
The construct of Mentalization, developed by psychoanalyst Peter Fonagy and colleagues 
(Fonagy, Gergely, Jurist, & Target, 2002) and also closely related to metacognition, focuses on 
genuine versus less genuine forms of integrated self-reflection (Fonagy et al, 2002; Lysaker & 
Klion, 2016). However, mentalization emphasizes that impairments in the capacity for self-
reflection and for reflecting on the thoughts of others arise primarily in the context of ruptured 
attachment. Metacognition research, on the other hand, sees metacognition and attachment as 
potentially independent (Outcalt et al., 2015; Lysaker & Klion, 2016), with integrative processes 
existing outside of the interpersonal context. This leaves room for metacognitive impairment to 
develop for reasons other than attachment rupture (memory, attention issues), or for 
metacognition to remain intact despite abuse, neglect, or relational trauma (Davis et al., 2016; 
Lysaker & Klion, 2016). Additionally, in metacognition as defined by Semerari and Lysaker and 
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colleagues, an individual’s ability to form complex ideas about the self and others is understood 
as separate from his or her ability to make use of that information in adaptive ways. Stark 
differences in these process are sometimes seen in borderline personality-disordered individuals, 
where those individuals have great difficulty successfully solving psychological problems, 
despite being able to form complex ideas and mental representations about the self and others 
(Lysaker & Klion, 2016; Semerari et al., 2014). The concepts of mindfulness and emotional 
intelligence are similar to metacognition in that they both emphasize increasing self-awareness 
and insight into the emotional experiences of others. Metacognition research however, 
specifically research related to the development of Metacognitive Reflection and Insight Therapy 
(MERIT), a loosely manualized treatment modality based on metacognition, has created an 
incremental and developmental model for understanding how these processes are integrated into 
a higher order framework for understanding and interacting with self and others, and how such 
processes can go awry. Such a model is lacking for both mindfulness and emotional intelligence 
(Lysaker & Klion, 2016).  
Differences between metacognition and related concepts are sufficient to warrant ongoing 
study and exploration of metacognition as a unique and central aspect of the human psyche, both 
in normal and abnormal psychology. DiMaggio and Lysaker (2010) propose a comprehensive 
definition of metacognition:   
reflections on self and social experience (Semerari et al., 2003), to the set of skills which 
makes it possible to use cues such as bodily signals, facial expressions or overt behaviors 
to grasp one’s own underlying emotions, thoughts and intentions as well as the emotions, 
thoughts and intentions of others (Semerari et al., 2007). It includes the ability to reason 
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about the contents of experience and, of the utmost importance, pragmatically to use 
knowledge of mental states to cope with suffering, to find solutions when faced with 
conflicting emotions, to negotiate with significant others the meaning of experience and 
to adapt to the social environment and find ways to reach goals (p. 4). 
Lysaker and Klion (2016) additionally note metacognition is not just an awareness of these 
processes of thinking about one’s thoughts and the thoughts of others, but a developmental and 
incremental process moving towards higher and higher levels of integration, and that can be 
studied and subject to direct intervention.  
In this study, Lysaker’s and colleagues definitions of metacognition are used to frame the 
investigation of metacognition and metacognitive change. Lysaker and Klion’s (2016) 
understanding of metacognition as a developmental and incremental process likewise provides a 
useful framework for measuring metacognitive differences and change over time. 
Contemporary Metacognitive Findings 
Metacognitive impairment in Schizophrenia samples. A significant amount of the 
current research on metacognition has been conducted on samples of individuals with 
schizophrenia spectrum diagnoses, and much of this research evidences significant 
metacognitive impairment in schizophrenia samples (Lysaker & Dimaggio, 2014). Deficits in 
metacognition assessed within the narratives of 61 men with schizophrenia were linked to 
increased symptoms, poorer quality of life, problems with neurocognition, and poorer awareness 
of illness (Lysaker et al., 2005). Lower metacognitive scores have been associated with an 
increase in the number of severe negative symptoms (Lysaker et al., 2005; Nicolò et al., 2012; 
Rabin, Hasson-Ohayon, Avidan et al, 2014) and predictive of future negative symptoms (Hamm 
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et al., 2012). They have also been linked with lower levels of functional competence (Lysaker, 
McCormick, et al., 2011), a poorer subjective sense of recovery (Kukla, Lysaker, & Salyers, 
2013), problems with therapeutic alliance (Davis, Eicher, & Lysaker, 2011), a decreased ability 
to deflect stigma (Nabors et al., 2014) and related to histories of impulsive violence in forensic 
patients (Bo, Abu-Akel, Bertelsen, Kongerlev, & Haarh, 2013; Bo, Abu-Akel, Kongerslev, 
Haahr, & Bateman, 2014). Metacognitive scores have been shown to predict future vocational 
function in schizophrenia samples (Lysaker, Dimaggio, Carcione, et al., 2010), as well as to 
mediate the impact of neurocognitive deficits of social function (Lysaker, Shea, et al., 2010). 
Lysaker and colleagues (2012) also found that study participants with schizophrenia had 
significantly more metacognitive deficits than a sample of participants with HIV, suggesting 
metacognitive deficits are more than just a downstream consequence of lifetime adversity. 
Lysaker and Dimaggio note that in the majority of these studies, the relationships between 
metacognition and levels of function remained even when controlling for neurocognitive 
impairment and severity of symptoms (Lysaker & Dimaggio, 2014). Please see Lysaker, Vohs, et 
al. (2013) for a comprehensive review. 
Metacognitive impairment in various psychiatric populations. Metacognitive deficits 
extend beyond the domain of schizophrenia and across the spectrum of mental illness. Morrison 
and Wells (2003) found psychotic patients who experience auditory hallucinations exhibited 
higher levels of dysfunctional metacognitive beliefs than either patients with schizophrenia-
spectrum disorders with persecutory delusions, patients with anxiety disorders, or a non-patient 
control group. They also found that patients with persecutory delusions and those with anxiety 
disorders experienced a similar number of dysfunctional metacognitive beliefs, and that both 
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groups had higher scores than the non-patient group. Morrison and colleagues (Morrison et al.. 
2011) also found associations between specific metacognitive beliefs and symptom presentation 
in a SMI sample, with negative metacognitive beliefs about paranoia resulting in greater distress 
and positive metacognitive beliefs about paranoia resulting in greater degree of paranoid 
delusions. Additionally, Vohs and colleagues (2014) found comparable metacognitive scores in 
both first episode and prolonged psychosis groups, suggesting that metacognitive deficits may be 
trait-like rather than situation dependent features. They also found those scores to be lower than 
those in a psychiatric control group comprised of individuals with substance use disorders, 
suggesting that different categories of mental illness differ in metacognitive dysfunction. All 
three groups evidenced metacognitive deficits in the category of mastery, which is in line with 
additional research that found problems using metacognitive knowledge to exist across various 
Axis I and Axis II disordered populations (Semerari et al., 2003; Dimaggio et al., 2007; Semerari 
et al., 2007; as cited in Vohs et al., 2014). Lastly, those with prolonged psychosis exhibited 
higher levels of metacognitive functioning for all categories except mastery, a promising finding 
suggesting metacognitive dysfunction can improve over time.  
In a study of 51 veterans suffering from PTSD, lower levels of self-reflectivity on the 
abbreviated Metacognitive Assessment Scale (MAS-a; discussed in Metacognitive Assessment) 
and higher levels of cognitive self-consciousness on the Metacognitions questionnaire (MCQ-30) 
were uniquely related to greater levels of self-blame, despite controlling for age, level of 
depression, and PTSD (Davis et al., 2016). Bouman and Meijer (1999) also noted specific 
metacognitive thoughts were characteristic of hypochondriacs (worry about a lack of control 
over thoughts of illness and cognitive self-consciousness), and the degree of dysfunction 
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amongst these thoughts mediated the severity of illness. These studies supports the idea that 
metacognitive deficits are not just general, down-stream symptoms of mental illness per se, but 
may be core features and mediators of disability (Dimaggio & Lysaker, 2010; see Morrison & 
Wells, 2003). Additional studies noted in Morrison and Wells (2003) suggested metacognition 
mediates severity in various psychological disorders including pathological worry and GAD 
(Wells & Carter, 2001), obsessive-compulsive symptoms (Wells & Papageorgiou, 1998), test-
anxiety (Matthews, Hillyard, & Campbell, 1999), and PTSD (Holeva, Tarrier, & Wells, 2001).   
Metacognitive impairment in personality disorders. Perhaps most pertinent to our 
investigation is the contemporary research outlining the relationship between personality 
disorders and metacognitive impairment.  
Mentalization and metacognition. Much of the literature surrounding impairments in 
reflective functioning in personality disordered populations has arisen through the work of 
Fonagy and colleagues. Through the investigation of problems associated with thinking about 
one’s own thinking and the thinking of others in borderline personality disorder (Fonagy, 1991), 
Fonagy developed the idea of mentalization, a similar concept to metacognition as noted and 
described above. Similar to Lysaker and Klion (2016), Fonagy and Bateman (2016) recognize 
the overlap between their term mentalization and metacognition and, without minimizing 
differences, see both as representative of higher-order mental processes representing the core of 
personality function. Though Fonagy and colleagues understand problems with reflective 
functioning in personality disorders as developing in the context of ruptured attachment, 
something metacognitive researchers do not assume, their work nonetheless is helpful for our 
study in that they demonstrate in repeated studies the profound impairment in “thinking about 
METACOGNITIVE CHANGES 16 
 
 
thinking” that is common in personality disorders. Examples of metacognitive impairment in 
personality disorders from the mentalization literature include the concept of “psychic 
equivalence” (Target & Fonagy, 1996), wherein individuals equate what is thought with what is 
real. Such experiences—similar developmentally to that of a normal 20 month old child (Gopnik 
& Meltzoff, 1997)—can be highly emotionally disturbing, akin to physical memories usually 
associated with posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD; Morrison, Frame, & Larkin, 2003). Fonagy 
and Luyten (2009) contend that such a mode of thinking is not representative of excessive 
egocentrism, but a failure to separate what is in one’s own mind from what is in the minds of 
others. Pretend mode, a mode of thinking wherein the internal mental world is decoupled from 
external reality (Ridenour, Knauss, & Hamm, 2018), is another example of a metacognitive 
failure found in BPD and is thought to be related to dissociation (Fonagy & Luyten, 2009).  
Teleological mode, a mode of thinking wherein “goal-directed actions take the place of words in 
representing one’s mental state and as a point of reference to trying to understand the minds of 
others,” is a third developmentally regressive and dysfunctional metacognitive mode of thought 
seen in BPD (Ridenour et al., 2018, p. 2).  
Also relevant is the concept of hypermentalizing, a metacognitive process wherein one’s 
assumptions about the minds of others become unrestrained, extending far beyond observable 
data (Sharp et al, 2013). Also referred to as excessive theory of mind (Dziobek et al., 2006) and 
pseudomentalizing for its lack of metacognitive accuracy (Allen, Fonagy, & Bateman, 2008), 
hypermentalizing is an alternative but problematic defensive metacognitive strategy, thought to 
be fueled by heightened emotional activation and chronic relational unpredictability. With it 
comes a certainty about the minds of others that can lead to misinterpretations about behaviors 
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and erroneous attributions about the intentions of others, commonly seen in BPD populations. 
Though several empirical studies demonstrate superior mentalization ability in BPD patients 
(Arntz & Veen, 2001; Fertuck et al., 2009; Franzen et al., 2011), these aspects of mentalization 
seem to be based more on explicit cognitive formulations of external features of self and others, 
such as facial expressions and behaviors, rather than evidence of a heightened accuracy in 
intuiting the mind of another (Satpute & Lieberman, 2006). Fonagy and Luyten (2009) 
additionally hypothesize that mentalization abilities are both trait and state dependent in BPD 
patients, with increased emotional arousal resulting in impaired mentalization, of which 
hypermentalization is one aspect.  
Psychological defenses can also be understood as impairments in mentalizing and 
metacognition. For example, the inability to tolerate intensely negative aspects of the self—
thought to be related to internalization of an abuser as part of the self—in those with BPD leads 
to the frequent externalization of these unacceptable states into others, resulting in chaotic 
interpersonal relationships with loved ones and therapists alike. Such projective processes 
perpetuate cycles of rejection and abandonment. For the individual with BPD, however, these 
processes may provide much-needed relief from intolerable emotions that otherwise could lead 
to self-harm or suicide (Fonagy & Luyten, 2009). In terms of metacognitive impairment, 
externalization and projective processes lead to poor awareness of the internal states of self and 
others, as well as to impairments in one’s ability to use metacognitive knowledge in an adaptive 
manner (metacognitive mastery). Interestingly, both Fonagy (1991) and Lysaker and Klion 
(2016) agree that with higher levels of metacognitive functioning, there is the potential for 
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greater levels of psychic pain, a similar phenomenon experienced in the psychoanalytic process 
of working through defenses (Stark, 1999).  
More recently, Fonagy, Luyten, and Allison (2015) argue that rigidity in personality, not 
merely its distortion, is a key component of personality disorders. They hypothesize that such 
rigidity arises when an individual is repeatedly exposed to situations—i.e., abuse, neglect—that 
undermine his or her ability to understand the mind of others and even his or her own mind. In 
consequence, social trust is undermined and the individual is unable to learn from others or from 
his or her own experiences. The authors argue that at the heart of such “epistemic petrification” 
is profound loneliness and isolation. Here again we see a failure of metacognition: regardless of 
the etiology of the disturbance, profound social difficulties will persist if one cannot reflect one’s 
own thoughts and the thoughts of others, learn from others or from experiences, reconsider 
perspectives, or formulate new ideas about and adapt to an ever-changing social milieu. Not 
surprisingly, the authors believe a continuous, coherent, and consistent therapeutic alliance in the 
context of psychotherapy creates the conditions for the re-establishment of epistemic trust, which 
is itself a precondition to the development of mentalizing/metacognitive capacity (Bateman et al., 
2018; Fonagy, Luyten, & Allison, 2015). This is in line with our hypothesis that metacognitive 
scores will improve in the context of psychoanalytic psychotherapy—to be discussed in more 
detail below—and provides a plausible mechanism of action for such improvement in the context 
of personality disorders. Though we must be careful not to over-generalize findings from BPD to 
other personality disorders, it is reasonable to assume that other personality disorders also 
develop as reified metacognitive coping strategies in response to social chaos and 
unpredictability.  
METACOGNITIVE CHANGES 19 
 
 
Additional evidence exists for the relationships between metacognitive dysfunction and 
personality disorders. In a mixed sample of BPD and avoidant personality disordered individuals, 
Antonsen, Johansen, Ro, Kvarstein, and Wilberg (2016) found lower levels of reflective 
functioning—a similar concept to Lysaker and Dimaggio’s (2014) metacognitive self-
reflectivity—to be associated with higher levels of symptomatic and interpersonal distress, 
greater issues with self-esteem, poorer psychosocial functioning, and more problems with 
relationships and identity development. Between the two groups, lower levels of reflective 
functioning were found in the avoidant personality group, indicating that metacognitive problems 
likely extend beyond BPD into the broader spectrum of personality disorders, and that 
diagnostic-specific differences in metacognition may exist. Lastly, the study found that groups 
with different levels of reflective functioning benefitted from different types of treatment. The 
authors suspect those with higher levels of reflective functioning had a greater ability to 
understand themselves and others, and therefore made better use of a psychodynamically 
structured group treatment program.  
A recent study also found that long-term hospitalization-based psychodynamic treatment 
was associated with significant decreases in mentalizing impairment and symptomatic distress 
amongst 175 patients with BPD diagnoses (De Meulemeester, Vansteelandt, Luyten, & Lowyck, 
2018). Though improvement in mentalization was strongly associated with decreases in 
symptomatic distress (r = .89), the study further supports the central role of metacognition within 
personality disorders, suggests that improvements in metacognitive processes may explain in part 
the therapeutic change process, at least in BPD, and provides context for our understanding 
metacognitive impairment in a similar patient population at ARC, a similar treatment facility.   
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  With regard to mentalization and metacognition in the context of attachment, one study 
on mentalization found that it is dysfunctional mentalizing itself, rather than emotional 
dysregulation that mediates the link between attachment coherence and features of BPD (Sharp 
et al., 2016). Similar findings from metacognition research (as opposed to mentalization research 
and further outlined below) were noted in Outcalt and colleagues (2016), where researchers 
found an interaction effect between metacognitive mastery and attachment, with metacognitive 
mastery moderating anxious attachment and better predicting BPD traits than attachment alone. 
Dimaggio and Lysaker (2015) highlight an important point of clinical agreement between 
mentalization and metacognition, namely that while metacognitive deficits exist at the trait level, 
they are modulated by the interpersonal context. Experiences of conflict, separation, social 
exclusion or isolation, threats from others, or real or imagined loss can disrupt metacognitive and 
mentalizing processes. For many, in an environment of understanding, attunement, and 
appropriate attachment, metacognitive capacity thrives (Liotti & Gilbert, 2011). 
Metacognition beyond mentalization. Metacognitive impairments in personality 
disorders and differences between personality-disordered groups are also found outside of the 
mentalization literature. In their article first describing the Metacognitive Assessment Scale 
(MAS), to be discussed in the Metacognition Assessment section below, Semerari and 
colleagues (2003) used the MAS to highlight metacognitive differences between an individual 
with BPD and one with NPD. Study results revealed the BPD patient has difficulties primarily 
with integrating thoughts of self and others into a coherent narrative and in making distinctions 
between mental representations and reality. However, the BPD patient did demonstrate a greater 
ability to recognize elements of the inner world of self and others, including thoughts, 
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representations, and emotions, and to recognize the relationships between those elements. The 
NPD patient, on the other hand, struggled to identify the elements of the inner world, but was 
readily able to differentiate between representation and reality. The NPD patient struggled with 
integrative efforts, but to a lesser degree than the BPD patient and improved more readily once 
his or her ability to identify core elements of thought and emotion improved. Both patients had 
impaired mastery functions, though in the BPD individual this metacognitive capacity was much 
more impaired, in line with previous findings (Linehan, 1993; Semerari, 2001) and did not 
improve to the same degree as the individual with NPD.  
In a later study, Semerari and colleagues (2005) found similar metacognitive problems 
present for a slightly larger BPD sample (n = 4), with BPD participants exhibiting difficulties 
integrating representations of self and others and differentiating between fantasy and reality. 
Problems with monitoring emotions for the NPD group were found as well, along with similar 
deficits with monitoring emotions in avoidant personality disorder (APD) individuals (Dimaggio, 
Procacci, et al., 2007). 
In a much larger sample (n = 306), Semerari and colleagues (2014) investigated 
metacognitive differences between various personality disorders (n = 198) and a control group 
with symptom disorders without PD diagnoses (n = 108). Results indicated greater metacognitive 
severity in the PD group than the control group and strong associations between metacognitive 
dysfunction and the degree of severity of the PD. While their results support the idea of global 
metacognitive dysfunction in PDs regardless of diagnosis, they also found different personality 
styles correlated with impairment in specific metacognitive sub-functions: withdrawal correlated 
with low monitoring (self-reflectivity), peculiarity with low differentiation and decentration, and 
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instability with low integration and differentiation (Semerari et al, 2014, p. 762). Their results 
suggest general metacognitive pathology across the PD spectrum as well as unique 
metacognitive profiles for different subgroups of PDs.  
In another relatively large study, Semerari and colleagues (2014) compared 
metacognitive abilities of a BPD group (n = 72) and a general PD group excluding BPD (n = 
125). When controlling for general severity of psychopathology, the results revealed that the 
BPD group scored significantly lower than the general PD group in the metacognitive areas of 
differentiation and integration. Degree of severity of psychopathology within the BPD group was 
strongly related to these metacognitive impairments as well. Together, these findings provide 
some empirical support for a prototypical “borderline” metacognitive profile linked to these two 
areas. 
Furthermore, in a study looking at 14 individuals with a variety of PDs, Carcione and 
colleagues (2011) found significant difficulties using metacognitive knowledge to problem-solve 
(mastery). They also found different levels of effort exerted in problem solving amongst different 
PDs, with BPD and dependent PD (DPD) individuals made the most attempts to solve problems 
compared to those with avoidant PD (APD), paranoid PD (PPD), or NPD. Additionally, 
metacognitive mastery strategies differed amongst the diagnoses, with DPD individuals tending 
to seek help and reassurance from others, the APD individuals had more success with avoidance 
strategies, and PPD and NPD utilizing more independent strategies.  
Metacognition and alexithymia. Nicolo and colleagues (2011) also found that higher 
levels of alexithymia—difficulty naming emotions and describing their causes and a critical 
aspect of metacognition—were associated with both global psychopathology, poor 
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representations of interpersonal relations, and uniquely related to avoidant, dependent, 
depressive, and passive-aggressive PDs. Cluster B PDs—histrionic, borderline, narcissistic, and 
antisocial—did not evidence such associations with alexithymia. The authors do note that the 
self-report instrument used (TAS-20) in the study may allow participants to under- or over-
estimate their own emotional awareness, which may explain deficits in self-knowledge in NPD 
samples found elsewhere (Dimaggio & Lysaker, 2015; Dimaggio, Procacci, et al., 2007). 
Nevertheless, the study further suggests metacognitive impairment throughout the PD spectrum 
as well as real metacognitive differences between types of PDs. 
 Metacognition and theory of mind. Investigating correlations between Theory of Mind 
(ToM)—a similar construct to metacognition as noted above—and socially aversive personality 
features such as narcissism, psychopathy, lack of empathy, and Machiavellianism, Vonk, 
Zeigler-Hill, Ewing, Mercer, and Noser (2015) found psychopathic traits were negatively 
correlated with indicators of ToM, emotional understanding, and emotional management. They 
also found grandiose narcissism—as opposed to vulnerable narcissism—was positively 
correlated with both indicators of ToM and indicators of emotional intelligence. Their study 
suggests metacognitive differences, particularly in the ability to make sense of the minds of 
others, play a role in differentiating impulsive, lower functioning disordered personalities from 
those that tend to be more cunning and manipulative. Interestingly, Semerari and colleagues 
(2014) cite Arntz, Bernstein, Oorschot, and Schobre (2009) and note that Cluster C patients—
those with either avoidant, dependent, or obsessive-compulsive PDs—showed the highest levels 
of understanding the minds of others in comparison to both BPD and healthy controls.  
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 Empathy as metacognition. Empathy is also related to ToM, and by extension, 
metacognition. In a review of relevant empathy literature, Semerari and colleagues (2014) cite 
several studies demonstrating that patients with BPD were better at resonating sympathetically 
with the emotional states of others (affective empathy), but worse at understanding others’ 
mental states (cognitive empathy; Harari, Shamay-Tsoory, Ravid, & Levkovitz, 2010; New et al, 
2012). However, they also note that those with antisocial PD or psychopathic traits displayed 
severely damaged emotional empathy (Blair et al., 2004) with relatively unimpaired cognitive 
empathy (Richell, Mitchell, & Newman, 2003). A sample of NPD patients demonstrated a lack 
of empathy in general (Given-Wilson, McIllwain, & Warburton, 2011) and less in comparison to 
a BPD group as well (Ritter et al., 2011).  
Metacognition and mindfulness. Deficits in mindfulness, another aspect of 
metacognition involving reflective capacity and awareness, have also been associated with 
antisocial PD (ASPD), aggression, and anger in an offender sample (Velotti et al., 2016). 
Interestingly, an interaction effect between mindfulness and expression of ASPD traits was also 
found, wherein those with higher levels of mindfulness—those able to be aware of their personal 
motives and behaviors—showed a much stronger relationship between levels of aggression and 
ASPD pathology. Differences in metacognitive ability, even within the same diagnostic category, 
may have important implications for treatment. Dimaggio and Brüne (2016) provide a somewhat 
comprehensive review of metacognitive literature for PDs. See for more details.  
Metacognitive impairments in Schizoid PD. Significantly less information is available 
about metacognitive impairments in Schizoid personality disorder (SPD) in comparison to BPD 
and NPD. There are rich accounts of schizoid mechanisms and schizoid issues found in the 
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psychoanalytic literature (Akhtar, 1987; Guntrip, 1976; Klein, 1946; Laing, 1965; McWilliams, 
2011), but only a handful of empirical studies found elsewhere. The DSM-IV (APA, 1994) 
defines SPD as a pervasive pattern of interpersonal detachment and restricted affective 
expression, and the ICD-10 (WHO, 1992) states SPD individuals have limited capacity to 
express feelings. The Psychodynamic Diagnostic Manual (PDM, 2006) stresses the idea of 
emotional ambivalence, as noted in Thylstrup and Hess (2009), wherein the SPD patient longs 
for closeness but fears it and experiences emotional pain with overstimulation. Thylstrup and 
Hess (2009) also note that emotional communication for the SPD patient is rare.  SPD 
individuals often appear disinterested in engagement with others, despite hypothesized longings 
for engagement. Psychic ambivalence may represent failures in higher-order integrative ideas 
about self and others, as well as problems with reaching, or even determining psychic problems 
and goals (Mastery).  
Several studies do allude to possible metacognitive deficits related to an impoverished 
awareness of one’s own inner world and difficulties integrating various aspects of self and 
others. Grant and colleagues (2004) found an association between SPD and emotional disability, 
and Cramer, Torgersen, and Kringlen (2006) found an association between an SPD diagnosis and 
poor quality of life that was stronger than the effects of Axis I pathology, health, or 
socioeconomic variables (cited in Triebwasser, Chemerinski, Roussos, & Siever 2012). Winarick 
and Bornstein (2015) note that contemporary views suggest that a deficit in the capacity for 
mentalization as well as empathy are core features of the diagnosis in both the DSM-5 (APA, 
2013) and trait based models, while De Rick and Vanheule (2007) found positive correlations 
between alexithymia and schizoid traits. [On a side note, alexithymia was also correlated with 
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antisocial traits in the same study, as well as with schizotypal, avoidant and dependent traits in 
Bach, de Zwaan, Ackard, Nutzinger, & Mitchell (1994).] Semerari and colleagues (2014) found 
schizoid PDs to be highly correlated with several stylistic components of personality pathology, 
including Withdrawal and Peculiarity. Of these, Peculiarity was in turn found to negatively 
correlate with the metacognitive domains of differentiation and decentration, suggesting greater 
peculiarity in schizoid presentation may be related to greater metacognitive impairments in terms 
of differentiation and decentration. In other words, schizoid individuals may struggle to 
recognize the subjectivity of their own thoughts and the representational nature of mental states 
(differentiation)—similar to Bateman and Fonagy’s (2004b) psychic equivalence mode and 
Melanie Klein’s paranoid/schizoid position (Klein, 1946)—and they may also struggle to make 
inferences about the mental states of others by adopting their perspectives (decentration). 
Furthermore, Carrasco and Lecic-Tosevki (2000) found people with SPD have an impaired 
ability to respond appropriately to social stimuli, suggesting the schizoid presentation is more 
than just a lack of desire to connect with others (cited in Esterberg, Goulding, & Walker, 2010).  
Metacognitive differences in SMI groups. Also under ongoing investigation, and 
central to our research question in this study, is the hypothesis that metacognitive deficits may 
manifest in unique ways depending on the type of presenting mental illness (Dimaggio & 
Lysaker, 2010). The evidence above, citing a variety of different metacognitive deficits 
associated with patients across the spectrum of mental illness, lends credence to this hypothesis. 
Such differences may have significant treatment implications. For example, Dimaggio and 
Lysaker (2010) suggest a lack of awareness of others due to dissociative processes occurring 
during intensive affective experience, such as in posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) and in 
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BPD, would require significantly different treatment from a more persistent lack of awareness of 
various internal states, such as in schizophrenia-spectrum disorders. Alternatively, patients with 
psychosomatic disorders associated with alexithymia (Taylor, Bagby, & Parker, 1997) might 
benefit from an entirely different metacognitive focus. Metacognitive deficits seen in patients 
with psychosis, schizophrenia-spectrum disorders, and substance-use disorders may reflect 
important gaps in reality testing, relational processes, and coping strategies (Lysaker, Buck, & 
Hamm, 2015), and thus may benefit from treatment focused on these areas.  As noted by 
Semerari and colleagues (2003), patients with different personality disorders seemed to exhibit 
unique metacognitive deficits in ways that support prominent theories of both narcissistic and 
borderline personality disorder development (Semerari et al., 2003; Kernberg, 1975; Kohut, 
1971; Linehan, 1993; Ryle, Leighton, & Pollock, 1997).  Further metacognitive research may 
help to support hitherto difficult to assess psychological constructs and important differences 
between overlapping diagnostic categories so often seen in personality disorders. Recognition of 
unique deficits in metacognition for different mental illnesses may prove to be enormously 
important for treatment (Lysaker, Buck, et al., 2011; Salvatore, Russo, Russo, Popolo, & 
Dimaggio, 2012), helping clinicians to provide therapeutic interventions tailored to the unique 
needs of specific populations.  
Neurobiological Correlates of Metacognition  
Several lines of research support the idea that the brain involves specific regions for 
metacognitive functioning. Mirror neuron research infers that we use the self as a model to 
imagine the mind of another (Gallese & Goldman, 1998), with highly specific mirror neurons 
activated by and responsive to both the observation of very specific complex actions of others as 
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well as to the body’s own actions (Fadiga, Fogassi, Pavesi, & Rizzolatti, 1995; Grafton, Fagg, 
Woods, & Arbib, 1996; Rizzolatti & Arbib, 1998;). The mirror neuron system, formed in part by 
a cortical network including the rostral section of the inferior parietal lobule, the caudal sector 
(pars opercularis) of the inferior frontal gyrus (IFG), and the adjacent part of the premotor 
cortex (Rizzolatti, Fogassi, & Gallese, 2001), provides a biological pathway for beginning to 
understand the ways in which we form hypotheses about the intentions of others and the inner 
workings of their thoughts, as mirror neuron researchers hypothesize that mirror neuron 
activation leads to an interoceptive experiential sense of actions observed in others. Rizzolatti 
and Arbib’s (1998) research also demonstrates how different percepts and thought constructs are 
associated with unique neurons and neuronal complexes in different areas, lending credence to 
the idea that different metacognitive domains—and their neurobiological correlates—can 
function semi-independently as well as interdependently. Building upon mirror neuron findings 
and further supporting the semi-independent functioning of metacognitive domains, Rizzolatti 
and colleagues (Gallese, Keysers, & Rizzolatti, 2004, Cattaneo & Rizzolatti, 2009; Rizzolatti & 
Craighero, 2004) argue that neuroimaging studies reveal two mirror neuron mechanisms in 
different locations: one wherein mirror neuron activation in the parietal lobe, premotor cortex, 
and caudal part of the inferior frontal gyrus (parietofrontal mirror system) provides the 
fundamental mechanism for an experiential understanding of others’ actions, and the other, 
involving viscero-motor center activation in the insula and the anterior mesial frontal cortex 
(limbic mirror system), underlies the experiential understanding of others’ emotions.  
Combining mirror neuron research with psychoanalytic developmental theory (Kohut, 
1984; Stern, 1985), Wolf, Gales, Shane and Shane (2001) hypothesize that the mirror neuron 
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system plays a crucial role in the development of empathy. Empathy, in turn, when understood as 
both an implicit affective resonance as well as a cognitive process of identifying with the 
emotional and psychological experience of another (Kohut, 1984; Wolf et al., 2001), can be seen 
interwoven throughout Lysaker and Klion’s (2016) metacognitive domains and levels of 
metacognitive awareness. This is not to conclude that the mirror neuron system or empathic 
processes are synonymous with high-order metacognitive processes—processes that are likely 
mediated to some degree by cognition and reflective capacity (discussed in the next 
paragraph)—but that the mirror neuron system does indeed play a crucial role in the 
development of social cognition and provides plausible and foundational neurobiological 
pathways for the development of metacognition, empathy, and related concepts (Gallese et al., 
2004; Sinigaglia, 2010).   
While mirror neuron system research provides us with a way of understanding how 
individuals learn things about self and others at a neurobiological level, additional research 
investigating higher order cognitive processes such as thoughts and beliefs—essential elements 
in the associative learning process necessary for successful integration of implicit interoceptive 
experiences and social adaptation (Reed & McIntosh, 2013)—also suggests that different 
metacognitive capacities, which are inherently comprised of higher order cognitive processes, 
may be linked to different parts of the brain. Similarly, Dimaggio and Lysaker (2010) described 
metacognition as referring to a set of skills that operate separately through different but 
overlapping cortical regions (Mitchell, Macrae, & Banaji, 2006). For example, brain regions 
representing belief contents appear different than those linked to reasoning about actions and 
goals as well as from those areas utilized for inhibition control and syntactic processing (Saxe, 
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Carey, & Kanwisher, 2004). False belief tasks used while studying ‘theory of mind’ have 
demonstrated activation of the right and left temporo-parietal junction (TPJ), the medial parietal 
cortex (PC), and the medial prefrontal cortex (MPFC; Gallagher et al., 2000; Saxe & Kanwisher, 
2003); while TPJ and PC activation also appear when thinking about the thoughts of others as 
opposed to thinking about other kinds of information about people (Saxe & Powell, 2006). 
Additionally, reasoning about one’s own emotional states and personality characteristics may 
result in different patterns of cortical activity than reasoning about those of others (Heberlein & 
Saxe, 2005).  
Integrating these two concepts of lower-order interoceptive states related to mirror 
neuron activity and raw emotional feeling and higher-order thought processes such as reflective 
capacity and beliefs about self and others, Panksepp and Northoff (2007) contend the two 
intertwine throughout development into a single meaning-making system. They argue that an 
individual’s concept of self and ability to develop and self-regulate within a complex social 
milieu is the result of this integration between the experiential and implicit neurobiological 
processes and the more explicit, reflective cognitive processes. This idea is similar to Fonagy and 
Bateman’s contention that all aspects of high-order cognition such as metacognition “relate to 
brain structure as a hierarchy of layers of abstraction and assume a top-down influence on lower 
orders of this neural pyramid” (2016, p. 59), and is also in line with Lysaker and Klion’s (2016) 
belief that metacognitive impairment is, at a fundamental level, an impairment in meaning 
making and the construction of a coherent and useful self-identity.  
Further integration between metacognition, neurobiology, and psychoanalysis will be an 
important part of our discussion, as we think about the ways in which personality-disordered 
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individuals manifest metacognitive differences, and whether these impairments are 
neurobiological, developmental or defensive in nature, or perhaps some combination of all three.  
Current Metacognitive Treatment Modalities 
A few treatment programs focus on improving metacognition as a treatment goal in 
rehabilitation and recovery (Dimaggio & Lysaker, 2010). Both Bateman and Fonagy’s (2004a) 
mentalization-based treatment and Dimaggio’s metacognitive interpersonal therapy (Dimaggio, 
Semerari, et al., 2007) seek to enhance self-other reflection in persons with personality disorders. 
Transference Focused Psychotherapy (TFP; Clarkin, Levy, Lenzenweger, & Kernberg, 2007), 
while not specifically designed to address metacognition, nonetheless seems to elicit positive 
metacognitive change by improving the ability to reason about mental states, as noted by 
changes in response to treatment on both the Adult Attachment Interview (AAI) and the 
Reflective Function (RF) coding scale (Levy et al., 2006). The effectiveness of TFP in improving 
metacognition is especially pertinent; it provides a precedent for understanding metacognitive 
change in the context of psychoanalytic psychotherapy, the focus of this present research 
endeavor. Jungian psychoanalyst Jean Knox (2013) similarly posits that reflective capacity, 
along with affect regulation and agency, is a key component of psychological growth and well-
being. Allen’s (2013) work on mentalization in the context of ‘plain-old therapy’ also supports 
the idea that what is being done in the process of talk therapy for trauma—often present in the 
personal narratives of personality-disordered individuals (Fonagy, Luyten, & Allison, 2015)—is 
essentially helping patients to think about their own thinking, a hallmark function of both 
psychoanalytic psychotherapy, mentalization, and metacognition.  
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Metacognitive Reflection and Insight Therapy, or MERIT, developed by Lysaker and 
colleagues is one of the newest and most promising metacognitive based-interventions. 
Developed in conjunction with the MAS-a assessment tool (described below in the Assessment 
of Metacognition section and used to assess metacognition in this study), MERIT is designed to 
simultaneously assess the metacognitive level of an individual across four metacognitive 
categories (as outlined above) and then intervene at an appropriate level of metacognitive 
maturity in a way that stimulates higher and higher levels of metacognition and insight.  
Assessment of Metacognition 
Metacognition is difficult to measure. Simple self-report measures are likely to under- or 
over-estimate the actual metacognitive abilities used on a day-to-day basis. Study situations 
designed to elicit metacognitive action are by definition different than real-world situations 
wherein metacognitive processes occur, and behavioral observation is similarly insufficient to 
capture the nuanced differences in metacognitive thought processes, as it attends to external 
rather than internal processes (Lysaker, Buck, et al., 2015). The Metacognition Assessment Scale 
(MAS; Semerari et al., 2003) has been a promising measurement tool. The MAS, first developed 
in Italian by authors from the Third Center for Cognitive Psychotherapy in Rome (Carcione, 
Falcone, Magnolfi, & Manaresi, 1997) and then translated into English (Semerari et al., 2003), 
was designed to evaluate general metacognitive capacity through the assessment of 
psychotherapy transcripts. The MAS is based on a synthesis of various models describing the 
key dimensions of metacognition, and focuses primarily on metacognitive capacity rather than 
metacognitive content (Lysaker, Buck, et al., 2015). The MAS focused on three sub-functions of 
metacognition: understanding one’s own mind, understanding the minds of another, and mastery, 
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or the ability to work through one’s mental representations and states to accomplish tasks or cope 
with problematic mental states (Semerari et al., 2003). Within each sub-function category, the 
scale consists of a series of items signifying different levels of metacognitive ability, arranged in 
a hierarchical order. To generate a metacognitive score, therapy transcripts are read and noted for 
opportunities to display metacognitive capacity and whether or not metacognitive capacity is 
demonstrated. Upon completion of the transcript reading, a ratio of hits to misses is created, with 
a higher ratio of hits to misses demonstrating better metacognitive capacity (Lysaker, Buck, et 
al., 2015). 
The MAS was designed to assess metacognition in persons with personality disorders. 
The scale was subsequently adapted by Paul Lysaker and his group at Indiana University School 
of Medicine for use specifically with schizophrenia and broader categories of mental illness. The 
adapted version, the abbreviated Metacognition Assessment Scale (MAS-a), provides a means 
for quantitative measurement of metacognitive capacity in persons with severe mental illness 
(Lysaker, Buck, et al., 2015). The scale was modified in important ways. First, the MAS-a is 
designed to be used with a spontaneously generated speech sample regarding psychological 
challenges and life stories. The authors argue that metacognitive capacity is best estimated over 
the natural telling of one’s own story, rather than a series of prompts or questions that may create 
opportunities for demonstrating metacognitive capacity (Lysaker, Buck, et al., 2015). Secondly, 
the MAS-a uses four scales to assess different aspects of metacognition, thought to be relatively 
semi-independent: “Self-Reflectivity”, the ability to think about one’s own mental states; 
“Understanding of Others’ Minds”, the ability to think about the mental states of others; 
“Decentration”, seeing the world as existing with others having independent motives; and 
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“Mastery”, the ability to implement effective strategies in order to cope with psychological 
problems and related distress (Lysaker, Buck, et al., 2015). Lastly, scoring has also changed. 
Rather than keeping track of opportunities for displays of metacognition and then creating a 
metacognitive score based on a hits-to-misses ratio, transcripts are evaluated for spontaneous 
demonstrations of metacognition within each metacognitive domain, with more sophisticated 
metacognitive statements receiving higher scores.  The scores are hierarchical, and with the 
exception of Mastery, all lower metacognitive levels must be demonstrated for the individual to 
receive a full score on a higher level of metacognition.  Higher scores are not considered if a 
lower-scoring metacognitive act is not met. Finally, the subscales can be summed to create a 
total score with a range of zero to 28. 
The original and modified scales are useful because they allow for an empirical, 
quantitative method for studying metacognition. The MAS-a is especially helpful in that it 
bypasses the need for metacognitive prompts and provides an important opportunity to observe 
metacognitive functioning in a less artificial capacity. A reliable and consistent scoring system 
such as the MAS/MAS-a can also help us to not only observe metacognitive deficits, but to track 
metacognitive changes over time. The nuanced method of assessing transcripts allows for 
metacognitive evaluation across settings, and perhaps even during real-time therapeutic 
encounters. While the MAS-a was designed to be used in conjunction with the Indiana 
Psychiatric Illness Interview (IPII; Lysaker, Clements, Plascak-Hallberg, Knipscheer, & Wright, 
2002), the assessment scale could theoretically be utilized during any similar open-ended, 
relatively non-structured clinical interview where there is some degree of questioning regarding 
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interpersonal and psychological functioning (Lysaker, Buck, & Ringer, 2007; Lysaker et al., 
2005). 
Austen Riggs Center and the Follow-Along Study 
One setting where the MAS-a is already proving useful is at the Austen Riggs Center 
(ARC), a long-term, psychoanalytic psychiatric hospital. ARC has conducted a large number of 
open-ended interviews for patients with severe mental illness (SMI) over the course of their 
eleven-year Follow-Along Study. While the IPII was not used, a similar interview, the Dynamic 
Interview (Fowler & Perry, 2005; Perry, Fowler, & Seminiuk, 2005), was administered initially 
at six month intervals, beginning at the time of admission, and when possible, continuing 
through and after extensive psychoanalytic treatment for the duration of the Follow-Along Study. 
These archival interviews provide an excellent opportunity to study metacognitive differences 
among patient groups and changes in response to treatment using the MAS-a.  
A pilot study with a very small sample size (n = 9) was conducted in the summer of 2016 
at ARC. Though statistical significance was not observed, likely due at least in part to our small 
sample size, large effect sizes were found for group differences in metacognition as well as for 
metacognitive change over time (Neal et al., 2017). Patients with narcissistic personality disorder 
(NPD) had higher scores in the metacognitive domain of mastery than patients with borderline 
personality disorder (BPD), while those with substance use disorders (SUD) achieved higher 
total metacognitive scores than patients with psychosis (PSY). Interestingly, while patients with 
BPD had large effect sizes (Cohen’s d > 1.00) in response to treatment, patients with SUD had 
large negative effect sizes in certain metacognitive domains. Such differences may have 
implications both for theoretical conceptualization of the various disorders studied and for 
METACOGNITIVE CHANGES 36 
 
 
facilitating more effective interventions (Lysaker, Buck, et al., 2011). Deepening our 
understanding of metacognitive differences may help us not only measure psychodynamic 
treatment outcomes but improve treatment protocols and outcomes as well. While this hypothesis 
is yet untested, perhaps patients with SUD and NPD may benefit from interventions designed to 
help increase awareness of the thoughts and feelings of others, while those with BPD may 
benefit more from interventions designed to stimulate higher levels of functioning across all 
metacognitive domains as well as to integrate metacognitive functioning across domains in the 
service of problem solving and mastery.  
The Present Study 
Given the promising development of metacognitive theory, assessment, and intervention, 
as well as the results of our pilot study, we are hopeful about the continued use of the MAS-a in 
investigating metacognition in SMI populations as well as in conjunction with a psychoanalytic 
treatment modality. This brings us to our current study.  Essentially, we want to know if paying 
attention to Metacognition can tell us something important about treating patients at ARC, and 
about treating patients with SMI in general. Therefore, the aim of our research is three-fold: (a) 
to add to the current knowledge of the ways in which metacognition acts as a mediating factor in 
mental illness by examining the ways in which thoughts about the self, thoughts about others, 
thoughts about one’s place in the world, and one’s ability to seek help and use skills might 
mitigate or worsen symptoms of mental illness; (b) to shed light on potential differences in 
metacognition among various mental health disorders, specifically narcissistic, schizoid, and 
borderline personality disorders; and (c) to examine the efficacy of long-term psychoanalytic 
psychotherapy for treatment of SMI. 
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We seek to achieve our aims by investigating group differences in metacognition and 
metacognitive outcomes amongst a sample of personality-disordered individuals at ARC. We 
chose to look again at NPD and BPD populations, and we added SPD diagnosed individuals to 
our sample due to both a limit in NPD patient transcripts available and curiosity about the ways 
in which a third personality disorder might present differently than either BPD or NPD. Our 
hypotheses are listed in bullet points below, with each followed by a brief summary of our 
rationale: 
• BPD/NPD/SPD groups would change at different rates across metacognitive domains 
(BPD ≠ NPD ≠ SPD; null hypothesis is BPD = NPD= SPD).  
• Self-reflectivity would increase over time for the sample as a whole (Self-Reflectivity n = 
28: Occasion 1 < Occasion 2) 
Our hypothesis that our different groups would exhibit different metacognitive profiles is based 
on the existing literature as well as the results of our pilot study. Our hypothesis that there would 
be global increases in self-reflectivity also occurred in the pilot study and intuitively makes 
sense, as increased metacognitive capacity, which could also be understood as greater insight, is 
a central goal of psychoanalytic psychotherapy. Greater levels of understanding lead to greater 
capacity for emotional regulation, psychological growth, and developing a sense of agency 
which facilitates behavioral change and reaching goals (Knox, 2013; Lysaker & Klion, 2016).  
We also hypothesized that, 
• NPD participants would demonstrate better overall Mastery than BPD participants, but  
• BPD participants would demonstrate more improvement over time 
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Again, these findings are similar to our findings in the pilot study and previous studies 
highlighting difficulties with mastery in BPD populations (Fonagy et al., 2015; Linehan, 1993; 
Semerari et al, 2003), and difficulties with change in NPD patients (Semerari et al., 2003). 
Theoretically, Fonagyet al.’s (2015) idea that central to the BPD diagnosis is an impairment in 
the ability to learn due to a profound loss of trust in others may explain in part why BPD patients 
struggle with mastery functions.  This loss of trust is thought to make it very difficult—without 
first specifically focusing on the reparation and development of such a capacity to trust—for 
BPD patients to rely on others and to make use of psychological and metacognitive strategies 
that would often be discussed in the therapeutic milieu.  Participants with Narcissism, on the 
other hand, may score higher on various metacognitive domains initially but be resistant to 
change for a variety of reasons. Individuals with NPD may not see their problem as part of their 
core identity, and therefore they may be more able to find treatment helpful for dealing with 
problems that actively alleviate symptoms. Pathological narcissism may be a more distressful 
phenomenon for those who love narcissists rather than for the narcissists themselves, though 
some would argue that a narcissistic existence has its own significant distresses, stemming from 
experiences of shame and humiliation (Bernardi & Eidlin, 2018; Kohut, 1971).  
Lastly, we hypothesized that,  
• The SPD group would have a metacognitive profile that was different than either the 
BPD or the NPD groups. Specifically, we hypothesized that Self-Reflectivity would be 
worse in the SPD group than either of the others 
This seemed like a reasonable hypothesis, due both to difficulties with emotional recognition—a 
key step in the MAS-a self-reflection hierarchy and as suggested by the literature outlined 
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above—as well as difficulties with formulating coherent and well-integrated narratives of the 
self—as suggested by psychoanalytic formulations of the schizoid personality as entailing split-
off self-aspects (Akhtar, 1987; Klein, 1946; McWilliams, 2006). 





Archival data gathered as part of the ARC Follow-Along Study (FAS) were employed. 
Participants signed consent at the time of initiation into the FAS, and all transcripts & narratives 
were de-identified prior to this current study. As noted above, the ARC Follow-Along Study is 
an 11-year, longitudinal project that gathered information from patients at six-month intervals. 
Patients accepted into the follow-along study were all patients who consented to be a part of the 
study and who were admitted to ARC during the time of the study. Patients admitted to ARC are 
individuals with multiple mental health diagnoses who have often been deemed “treatment 
resistant.” At the time of this study, 80% of patients meet criteria for treatment refractory mood 
disorders; 40% had had six or more self-destructive episodes; 50% had made at least one serious 
suicide attempt; 60% had had three or more pre-Riggs hospitalization; 60% had also experienced 
early neglect, trauma, or abuse; and approximately 35% met criteria for post-traumatic stress 
disorder (Austen Riggs Center, 2016). Common diagnoses at ARC include personality disorders, 
psychosis, substance use, mood disorders, and anxiety disorders. Patients live in a restraint-free 
open setting where they are encouraged to stay but can come and go should they choose. They 
participate in multiple group therapies weekly as well as individual psychodynamic 
psychotherapy four-times a week. Patients have access to both psychiatric and psychological 
services and participate in thorough psychological testing processes.  
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Patients initially agree to stay at ARC for a minimum of six weeks, though they often 
stay much longer, with average length of stay being six months (Austen Riggs Center, 2016). 
The FAS collected assessment and interview data upon arrival to ARC and every six months 
during and following treatment for as long as the patient could be reached by ARC for the 
duration of the Follow-Along Study. ARC has hundreds of archived transcripts of interviews 
conducted at these six-month intervals. This current study uses transcripts selected from this 
archival data.  
Twenty-eight individuals from the Follow-Along Study sample who received diagnoses 
of borderline personality disorder (BPD), narcissistic personality disorder (NPD), or schizoid 
personality disorder (SPD) were selected as participants for this study. To be included, patients 
were required to have completed the intake assessment and a second assessment at least six 
months later. Table 1 includes general demographic information, including average length of 
stay.   
Participants in the sample ranged in age from 16 to 50 years old with a mean of 29.9 
years. 75% of participants were female, though the BPD group was 100% female and the NPD 
group was 75% male. The SPD group was 60% female and 40 % male. 93% (26) of the sample 
identified as Caucasian and 7% (2) identified as Asian. 64% identified as American, 7% as 
Jewish, and 29% unknown with regard to ethnicity. 3% had completed only high school, 43% 
had attended only some college, 36% had completed college, and 18% had obtained a graduate 
professional degree. Average initial length of stay was 18.3 months and average total length of 
stay was 20.2 months. The number of average readmissions was 0.29, and the average GAD 
score upon admission was 39.2.  




Sample Demographics Overall and By Group 
 Overall BPD NPD SPD 
 (N = 28) (N = 14) (N = 4) (N = 10) 
Age in years M      
(SD) 29.9 (9.8) 34.5 (10.5) 22.5 (3.1) 26.5 (7.5) 
Gender N(%)     
Female 21 (75%) 14 (100%) 1 (25%) 6 (60%) 
Male 7 (25%) 0 (0%) 3 (75%) 4 (40%) 
Race N(%)     
White (Caucasian) 26 (93%) 14 (100%) 3 (75%) 9 (90%) 
Asian 2 (7%) 0 (0%) 1 (25%) 1 (10%) 
Ethnicity N(%)     
American  18 (64%) 8 (57%) 3 (75%) 7 (70%) 
Jewish 2 (7%) 2 (14%) 0 0 
Unknown 8 (29%) 4 (29%) 1 (25%) 3 (30%) 
Level of Education N(%)     
Graduate Professional Degree 5 (18%) 5 (36%) 0 0 
College Completed 10 (36%) 3 (21%) 2 (50%) 5 (50%) 
Some College 12 (43%) 5 (36%) 2 (50%) 5 (50%) 
Completed HS/Equivalent 1 (3%) 1 (7%) 0 0 
Ave Initial Length of Stay  (in months) 18.3 16.5 22.1 19.4 
Ave Length of Stay including 
Readmissions  
20.2 17.6 23.7 22.5 
# of Readmissions (Ave) .29 0.3 0.5 0.2 
GAD scores M(SD) 39.2 (8.6) 39.4 (8.6) 43.5 (4.5) 37 (9.9) 
 
 
Participants selected had to have completed at least two dynamic interviews at least six 
months apart, and the transcripts of those interviews had to be legible. As noted above, 
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participants carried, on average, approximately six diagnoses at the time of admission (Austen 
Riggs Center, 2018). Within our sample, participants averaged approximately 4 diagnoses. In 
order to control for the impact of additional diagnoses not under investigation in this study, NPD 
participants (the smallest group that met inclusion criteria) and SPD participants were matched 
with BPD participants (our largest group) according to additional diagnostic categories. For 
example, an NPD individual with depressive disorder and eating disorder diagnoses would be 
matched with a BPD individual also diagnosed with both a depressive disorder and an eating 
disorder. Similarly, an SPD individual with a mood disorder with psychotic symptoms would be 
matched with a BPD individual who presented with a similar diagnosis. Participants initially 
selected for the study who were deemed to have illegible transcripts were removed from the 
study and replaced with a candidate who could be matched with another participant of a different 
diagnosis in the manner outlined above. Group membership was based on diagnosis listed in the 
FAS database; individuals with personality diagnoses of both BPD and NPD were placed in the 
NPD group, while individuals with personality diagnoses of both BPD and SPD were placed in 
the SPD group. Table 2 lists the different diagnoses and the number of individuals with each 
diagnosis present by groups. Efforts were made to match participants as closely as possible, but 
complex psychiatric presentations with multiple diagnoses made exact pairing difficult. 
Diagnostic totals therefore differ slightly from group to group.  
 
  




Number of Diagnoses Present Overall and in Each Group by General Diagnostic Category 
  O BPD NPD SPD 
DSM-IV 
Diagnostic Code 
Diagnosis n n n n 
 
295.60 &  
295.90 
Schizophrenia Spectrum Disorder 2 - - 2 
295.70 Schizoaffective Disorder 3 2 1 - 
296.20-296.36 Major Depressive Disorder 17 9 2 6 
296.52-296.62 Bipolar disorder I 2 1 - 1 
296.89 Bipolar disorder II 1 1 - - 
297 Delusional Disorder 1 - - 1 
298.90 Psychotic Disorder NOS 3 2 1 - 
299.80 Asperger’s/ Pervasive Dev. Disorder NOS - - - 1 
300.00 Anxiety Disorder NOS 1 1 - - 
300.01 Panic Disorder without Agoraphobia 2 1 1 - 
300.02 Generalized Anxiety Disorder 1 1 - - 
300.14 Dissociative Identity Disorder 1 1 - - 
300.15 Dissociative Disorder NOS 4 3 - - 
300.21 Panic Disorder with Agoraphobia 1 - - 1 
300.23 Social Phobia 1 - 1 - 
300.30 Obsessive-compulsive Disorder 3 - 1 2 
300.40 Dysthymic Disorder 13 7 2 4 
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Table 2 (continued from previous page) 
  O BPD NPD SPD 
DSM-IV 
Diagnostic Code 
Diagnosis n n n n 
300.60 Depersonalization Disorder 1 - - 1 
301.13 Cyclothymic Disorder 1 - - 1 
303.90 Alcohol Dependence 1 - 1 - 
304.20 Cocaine Dependence 1 - - 1 
304.80 Polysubstance Dependence 4 1 2 1 
305.00 Alcohol Abuse 4 3 - 1 
305.40 Alcohol Related Disorder NOS 1 - - 1 
305.90 Sedative, Hypnotic, or Anxiolytic Abuse 1 1 - - 
305.90 Other or Unknown Substance Abuse 3 1 1 1 
307.50 Eating Disorder NOS 3 1 1 1 
307.51 Bulimia Nervosa 2 2 - - 
309.81 Posttraumatic Stress Disorder 5 3 - 2 
315.90 Learning Disorder NOS 1 - - 1 
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Table 2 Alternative 
 
Number of Diagnoses Present Overall and in Each Group by General Diagnostic Category 
  O BPD NPD SPD 
DSM-IV 
Diagnostic Code 
Diagnosis n n n n 
295.60-295.90 Schizophrenia Spectrum Disorders 5 2 1 2 
296.20-296.36 Major Depressive Disorders 17 9 2 6 
296.52-296.62 Bipolar disorder I 2 1 - 1 
296.89 Bipolar disorder II 1 1 - - 
297 Delusional Disorder 1 - - 1 
298.90 Psychotic Disorder NOS 3 2 1 - 
299.80 Asperger’s/Pervasive Dev. Disorder NOS - - - 1 
300.00-300.23 Anxiety Disorders 11 6 2 1 
300.30 Obsessive-compulsive Disorder 3 - 1 2 
300.40 Dysthymic Disorder 13 7 2 4 
300.60 Depersonalization Disorder 1 - - 1 
301.13 Cyclothymic Disorder 1 - - 1 
303.90-305.90 Substance Use Disorders 15 6 4 5 
307.50 Eating Disorder NOS 3 1 1 1 
307.51 Bulimia Nervosa 2 2 - - 
309.81 Posttraumatic Stress Disorder 5 3 - 2 
315.90 Learning Disorder NOS 1 - - 1 
347.00 Narcolepsy 1 - - 1 
 
 




Dynamic interview. Interview transcripts were derived from a 50-minute semi-structured 
clinical interview called the Dynamic Interview (Fowler & Perry, 2005; Perry et al., 2005). 
While the Dynamic Interview is different from the IPII utilized in the development of the MAS-
a, Lysaker, Buck, et al. (2015) have used the MAS-a with psychotherapy transcripts to evaluate 
metacognitive growth for individuals with schizophrenia in two separate case reports (Lysaker et 
al., 2005; Lysaker, Buck, & Ringer, 2007), setting a precedent for expanded use of the MAS-a in 
open ended interview tools such as the Dynamic Interview.  
The abbreviated Metacognitive Assessment Scale. The abbreviated Metacognition 
Assessment Scale (MAS-a), (Lysaker, Buck, et al., 2015; Semerari et al., 2003), was used to 
evaluate four primary metacognitive domains: “Self-Reflectivity,” awareness of self; 
“Understanding of Other’s Minds,” awareness of the mind of another; “Decentration,” seeing the 
world as existing with others having independent motives, and “Mastery,” the ability to use 
effective strategies to cope with relational and psychological distress. Each scale consists of a 
series of evaluative measures that are arranged in hierarchical order. Transcripts were coded for 
increasingly complex levels of each metacognitive capacity and total metacognitive capacity.  
MAS-a reliability. The MAS-a has been found to demonstrate consistently good 
interrater reliability (Lysaker, Buck, et al., 2015). Lysaker, Buck, et al. (2007) found strong 
internal consistency amongst the subscales, and Lysaker, Buck, et al. (2008) found significant 
intra-class correlations for all MAS-a subscales, ranging from r = 0.61 (p < 0.05) for 
Decentration to r = 0.93 (p < 0.0001) for total metacognitive score. Significant test-retest 
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reliability was also demonstrated, with intra-class correlations ranging from 0.68 for 
Decentration to 0.85 for Total Metacognitive Score.  
MAS-a validity. The various domains of metacognition outlined by the MAS-a have been 
shown to correlate with numerous other measures of mental well-being (Lysaker, Buck, et al., 
2015). Self-reflectivity among participants with schizophrenia diagnoses has been linked with 
assessments of awareness of illness (Lysaker et al., 2005), cognitive insight (Lysaker, Warman, 
et al., 2008), and work placement performance (Lysaker, Dimaggio, Caricione, et al., 2010). 
Mastery has been found to buffer the impact of neurocognitive deficits on social function 
(Lysaker, Shea, et al., 2010) and influence social relationships consistently over time (Lysaker, 
Erickson, et al., 2011). Functional capacity and self-reports of coping strategies and self-esteem 
are also correlated with metacognitive mastery scores (Lysaker, McCormick, et al., 2011; 
Lysaker, Erikson, et al., 2011). Both mastery and self-reflectivity appear to be insight-related, 
predicting awareness of symptoms and consequences of illness (Lysaker, Dimaggio, Buck et al., 
2011) and associated with complexity of social schemas (Lysaker, Dimaggio, Daroyanni, et al., 
2010). Metacognitive deficits associated with schizophrenia also appear to be more severe than 
those associated with significant physical health adversity, suggesting changes in metacognition 
result from more than stress and or reduced coping ability (Lysaker, Ringer, et al., 2012). Nicolò 
et al. (2012) provide similar psychometric results in an Italian replica study following translation 
of the MAS-a.  
With regards to convergent validity, MAS-a scores are correlated with performance on 
the Scale to Assess Narrative Development (STAND), a scale that measures depth of personal 
narrative (Lysaker, Buck, et al., 2008). The Mastery subscale of the MAS-a was also correlated 
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with indices on the Social Cognition and Object Relations Scale (SCORS; Westen, 1991) 
assessing awareness of the psychological complexity and mutuality of interpersonal 
relationships. With regards to divergent validity, MAS-a scores are uncorrelated with 
theoretically unrelated self-experiences such as internal stigma (Lysaker, Buck, et al., 2008). 
MAS reliability. As the MAS-a was adapted from the MAS, reliability and validity of the 
MAS supports use of the MAS-a. Test construction of the MAS is outlined in Semerari et al. 
(2003); each item was discussed and approved by the research group after reviewing available 
literature and session transcripts. An intra-class correlation found good overall reliability from 
0.83 for understanding the mind of the other to 0.89 for understanding one’s own mind and total 
score (Lysaker et al. 2005).  
MAS validity. As outlined in Carcione et al. (2008), construct validity was supported by 
comparing metacognitive processes to available literature on mentalization and attachment 
(Fonagy et al., 2002; Main, 1991), metacognition in the context of learning processes (Flavell, 
1979), theory of mind (Baron-Cohen et al., 1985; Premack & Woodruff, 1978), meta-
representation (Firth, 1992; Sperber, 2000), metacognitive regulation (Nelson & Narens, 1990) 
and mastery of problematic experiences (Stiles et al., 1990).  
Concurrent validity has been demonstrated (Lysaker et al., 2005) as well in a comparison 
of the MAS with data from the Scale to Assess Unawareness of Mental Illness (SUMD; Amador 
et al., 1994), a scale designed to measure insight into awareness of disease, with higher self-
reflection scores correlating with better awareness of illness. The same study investing a 
schizophrenia sample demonstrated metacognitive performance to be related in meaningful and 
predictable ways to neuro-cognition; symptoms, including emotional withdrawal, depression, 
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and suspiciousness; and poor quality of life (Lysaker et al., 2005). MAS subscales are also 
correlated with performance tests of affect recognition (Lysaker, Buck & Ringer, 2007), and the 
MAS self-reflection subscale was associated with low levels of emotionality on the Therapeutic 
Cycle Model (TCM; Mergenthaler & Bucheim, 2000), a theoretically related construct used to 
assess emotional awareness (Gelo, Carcione, Dimaggio, Nicolò, & Mergenthaler, 2007). 
 Additional materials gathered in the Follow-Along Study. Multiple interviews and 
inventories were administered throughout the Follow-Along Study and are listed below. 
However, our current research goals necessitate only that the Diagnostic Interviews for selected 
patients along with diagnoses and demographics be made available at this time.  
• Defense Style Questionnaire (DSQ) 
• Brief Symptom Inventory (BSI) 
• Hamilton Anxiety Rating Scale (HAM-A) 
• Hamilton Depression Rating Scale (HAM-D) 
• Impulse/Anger Checklist 
• LIFE Interview: Diagnostic Interview 
• Guided Clinical Interview (GCI) 
• Structured Clinical Interview (SCID) for DSM-IV Axis I Disorders 
• LIFE Interview:  
o Psychosocial Role Functioning 
o  Global Assessment of Functioning Scale (GAF) 
o Psychosocial Treatment Inventory (PTI) 
o Paykel-Uhlenhuth Life Events Scale Coding Sheet 




• RAP-Relationship Anecdote Paradigm 
• Dynamic Interview 
• Loevinger Sentence Completion Test 
• NEO 5-Factor Personality Inventory 
• Coding Systems 
o Core Conflictual Relationship Themes (CCRT) 
o Defense Mechanism Rating Scale (DMRS) 
o Psychodynamic Conflict Rating Scale (PCRS) 
o Traumatic Antecedent Interview (TAI) 
o Patterns of Childhood Experience (PCE) 
o Wishes and Fears (W&F) 
o Social Cognition and Object Relations Scale (SCORS) 
Procedure 
The participants with desired diagnostic characteristics were chosen from within the 
group of participants for the ARC Follow-Along Study (see participants section above for 
details). During the Follow-Along-Study, semi-structured interviews were initially administered 
at the beginning of treatment and in six-month intervals—when possible—for patients involved 
in the Follow Along Study. Interviews were then transcribed. Two interview transcripts at least 
six months apart for each of the participants included in the sample were obtained and used in 
this study. The two MAS-a coders were both blind to personality group, but only one MAS-a 
coder was blind to whether the transcript was derived at the first or second occasion. 




Scores for individual metacognitive domains as well as total metacognition scores were 
computed and compared between personality groups and across time. Basic descriptive statistics 
were calculated for borderline, narcissistic, and schizoid personality groups. Analyses of Co- 
Variance (ANCOVAs) and Repeated Measures t-Tests were conducted to investigate for changes 
over time, differences between groups, and the interaction between groups and occasions over 
time. Finally, effect sizes were calculated for the ANCOVAs and the repeated measures T-tests. 
 





Twenty-eight participants that met inclusion criteria were recruited from the archival data 
of the ARC Follow-Along Study as outlined above. Transcripts from two occasions at least six 
months apart—the first of which corresponded with initiation of treatment at ARC—were coded 
for metacognition using the MAS-a for each individual. Mean and standard deviations for MAS-
a scores by overall sample and by group across occasions are displayed in Table 3.  
 Using SPSS 25.0, ANCOVAs were conducted on each metacognitive scale with 
Occasion 1 as a covariate to account for the relatedness of our sample across occasions (Hayes & 
Rockwood, 2017). Despite the unidirectional nature of one of our hypotheses (BPD > change 
over time than NPD), we opted for a bidirectional analysis in order to capture results not 
predicted and to reduce the likelihood of a Type I error. The alpha level for significance testing 
was set at 0.05. Levene’s test of Equality of Error Variances are reported in Table 4. Lack of 
statistical significance suggests homogeneity of variance throughout the sample. However, a 
trend towards significance for the total score may indicate heterogeneity of variance within the 
sample that currently cannot be observed (Field, 2013). Larger group sizes in future studies may 
help to detect group differences in variance. 
 
  




MAS-a Means and Standard Deviations - Whole Sample and By Groups on Separate Occasions  
 Overall BPD NPD SPD 
MAS-a Scale (n = 28) (n = 14) (n = 4) (n = 10) 
 
Occasion 1 
Self-Reflectivity M(SD) 4.54 (1.00) 4.57 (1.00) 4.75 (1.19) 4.43 (1.03) 
Awareness of others M(SD) 3.76 (0.72) 3.75 (0.52) 3.94 (1.56) 3.70 (0.56) 
Decentration M(SD) 1.30 (0.46) 1.30 (0.50) 1.25 (0.68) 1.33 (0.35) 
Mastery M(SD) 4.65 (0.89) 4.80 (0.80) 4.13 (1.18) 4.65 (0.91) 
Total M(SD) 14.26 (2.47) 14.43 (2.22) 14.10 (4.07) 14.10 (2.36) 
 
Occasion 2 
Self-Reflectivity M(SD) 5.27 (1.31) 5.25 (1.19) 5.00 (1.84) 5.40 (1.37) 
Awareness of others M(SD) 4.00 (0.88) 3.96 (0.75) 3.94 (1.39) 4.08 (0.92) 
Decentration M(SD) 1.47 (0.45) 1.54 (0.45) 1.38 (0.75) 1.43 (0.33) 
Mastery M(SD) 5.34 (1.07) 5.25 (0.87) 5.75 (1.50) 5.30 (1.23) 
Total M(SD) 16.08 (3.31) 16.00 (2.86) 16.06 (5.46) 16.20 (3.34) 
  








F Statistic (2,25) 
 
P value(𝛂=0.05) 
Self-Reflectivity 0.81 0.46 
Awareness of Others 1.53 0.24 
Decentration 0.02 0.98 
Mastery 1.42 0.26 
Total 2.85 0.08 
 
 
Table 5 displays the ANCOVA outcomes for all metacognitive domains with 
corresponding effect sizes.  Bonferroni’s correction for multiple statistics was not applied due to 
the high number of repeated measures t-tests run in order to calculate effect sizes by group and 
metacognitive domain. Statistical significance (α < 0.05) should be interpreted with caution. 
Nevertheless, the small p value for each of the univariate regression outcomes (see Table 5) 
suggests statistically significant findings for all metacognitive domains—except Mastery—even 
if Bonferroni’s correction were to be applied. 
For the sample as a whole, statistically significant changes were found across all 
metacognitive scores. Effect sizes in terms of 𝛈2	for	all	domains	with	the	exception	of	Mastery	are	considered	small.	Effect	size	for	Mastery	is	considered	negligible.	However,	in	terms	of	partial	𝛈2,	effect sizes are larger. When looking at repeated measures t-tests for the sample as a 
whole, all statistics were considered significant at the 0.05 level and Cohen’s d effect sizes were  
 




ANCOVA Outcomes and Effect Sizes by Metacognitive Domain 
Metacognitive 
Domain 
F Statistic p value(𝛂=0.05) Effect size 
(partial 𝛈2) Effect	size	𝛈2 
Self-Reflectivity F(2,25) = 26.47 < 0.001 0.52 0.027 
Awareness of others F(2,25) = 41.35  < 0.001 0.63 0.028 
Decentration F(2,25) = 11.55  0.002  0.33 0.026 
Mastery F(2,25) = 5.41 0.029 0.18 0.007 
Total F(2,25) = 27.16 < 0.001 0.53 0.021 
 
 
small to large. Largest effects were noted with Self-Reflectivity (d = 0.78) and Total scores (d = 
0.85). 
When examining individual groups using ANCOVAs, no significant group differences or 
interaction effects between personality diagnosis and time were found for any metacognitive 
domain. Repeated measures t-tests were subsequently conducted on each metacognitive scale for 
each group individually to observe potential trends and subtle differences in effect sizes within 
each group. Cohen’s d effect sizes were calculated using the equation recommended by Morris 
and DeShon (2002) for repeated measures. Results with corresponding effect sizes are listed in 
Table 6.  Bonferroni’s correction was not applied; statistical significance (α < 0.05) should be 
interpreted with caution. 
  




Repeated Measures T-test Outcomes with Corresponding Effect Sizes by Metacognitive Domain 
and by Group 
 Total (n = 28)  BPD (n = 14)  NPD (n = 4)  SPD (n = 10) 
Domain t(27) p d  t(13) p d  t(3) p d  t(9) p d 
Self-Ref. 4.12 < 0.001 0.78  3.02 0.01 0.81  2.77 0.02 0.37  0.74 .51 0.87 
Others 2.34 0.027 0.44  1.84 0.09 0.49  1.67 0.13 0.00  0.00 1.00 0.53 
Decen. 2.11 0.044 0.43  1.76 0.10 0.49  0.77 0.46 0.87  1.73 0.18 0.54 
Mastery 3.27 < 0.003 0.65  2.02 0.07 0.54  1.62 0.14 1.18  2.36 0.10 0.75 
Total 4.22 < 0.001 0.85  2.98 0.01 0.83  2.25 0.05 1.09  2.18 0.12 0.89 
 
 
Figures 1-5 display mean changes over time for each metacognitive domain with 
corresponding effect sizes. 
Results indicate all categories of Metacognition improve over time in response to 
treatment for the sample as a whole. Effect sizes for the sample as a whole were small to large, 
with the largest being in the category of Self-Reflectivity and Total Metacognitive Score. With 
regard to group differences, however, no statistically significant differences were observed. 
When repeated measures t-tests were conducted on each group individually to assess for unique 
features of change over time, different effect sizes were found depending on the group and the 
metacognitive domain (see Table 6). While differences in effect sizes may indicate possible 
differences between groups in the way that groups change over time, this was not captured by the 
ANCOVA results mentioned earlier. Results should be interpreted with caution. 
  








Figure 2. Changes in Awareness of Others’ by Groups Over Time. 
































Figure 3. Changes in Decentration by Groups Over Time. 
 
 
Figure 4. Changes in Mastery by Groups Over Time. 









































Figure 5. Changes in Total Metacognitive Score by Groups Over Time. 
 
Hypothesis Testing 
With regard to our first hypothesis, that BPD/NPD/SPD groups would change at different 
rates across metacognitive domains (BPD ≠ NPD ≠ SPD; null hypothesis is BPD = NPD= 
SPD), results indicate that personality diagnosis (NPD, BPD, or SPD) did not influence the rate 
of metacognitive change. No differences were found between the groups for any of the 
metacognitive domains. Here we retain the null hypothesis.  
Our second hypothesis, that Self-Reflectivity would increase over time for the sample as a 
whole (Self-Reflectivity n = 28: Occasion 1 < Occasion 2), was confirmed. Additionally, 
metacognitive change was found to exist at statistically significant levels across all 
metacognitive domains with medium to large effect sizes (Table 5 & Table 6).  
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Our third hypothesis, that NPD participant would demonstrate better overall Mastery 
than BPD patients, was not supported at the level of statistical significance. However, the effect 
size for Mastery for NPD participants was larger (d = 1.18) than either the BPD group (d = 0.54) 
or the SPD group (d = 0.75; Table 6), suggesting group differences may be found with a larger 
sample size.  
Our fourth hypothesis, that BPD participants would demonstrate more improvement than 
NPD patients over time, was not supported at the level of statistical significance either. Effect 
sizes for the BPD group were found to be larger than the NPD group for categories of Self-
Reflectivity and Awareness of Others, but smaller for the categories of Decentration, Mastery, 
and Total Metacognitive Scores (Table 6).   
Our fifth hypothesis, that the SPD group would have a different metacognitive profile 
than either the BPD or the NPD group, also was not supported at the level of statistical 
significance. However, effect sizes (Table 6) indicate the SPD group had more improvement in 
every metacognitive category than the BPD group, but was out performed in the categories of 
Decentration, Mastery, and Total Metacognitive Scores by the NPD group.  
Our last hypothesis, that Self-Reflectivity would be worse in the SPD group than either 
the BPD or NPD group, also was not supported at the level of statistical significance. In 
addition, the SPD group had the largest change as shown by effect size for Self-Reflectivity out 
of all the groups (Table 6). While not statistically significant, mean scores for the Self-
Reflectivity category for the SPD group were lower than the other groups initially, but ended up 
higher than both on the second occasion. 
 





This study set out to examine metacognitive group differences between BPD, NPD, and 
SPD populations in response to a psychoanalytic psychotherapy intervention. Goals included 
adding to the literature on personality disorders and metacognition, highlighting unique 
characteristics of specific personality disorders (BPD, NPD, and SPD), and increasing the 
evidence-base for psychoanalytic psychotherapy as an acceptable treatment modality for SMI. 
The findings of this study were successful in meeting these goals to some degree, though our 
hypotheses were not confirmed unilaterally, as noted above.  
With regard to psychoanalytic psychotherapy as an acceptable treatment modality for 
SMI, this study indicates significant metacognitive change occurred regardless of personality 
diagnosis (Table 5), with medium effect sizes across four metacognitive domains and a large 
total metacognitive effect size (Table 6). Self-reflectivity showed the greatest effect amongst the 
metacognitive subcategories (d = 0.78). Though the mean changes (Table 3) for the group as a 
whole range from only 0.25 points (Decentration) to almost 1.75 points (Total), such differences 
represent clinically relevant metacognitive changes, especially in a SMI population. For 
example, a d = 0.73 increase in Self-Reflectivity from 4.54 to 5.27 reflects the progress of 
someone who has had difficulty recognizing the fallibility of their own thoughts becoming able 
to not just to recall moments when they were wrong, but to begin to recognize the limits of what 
they can attain in the here and now. An albeit smaller difference in Awareness of Others from a 
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mean score of 3.76 to 4.00 signifies some level of clinical change as well; participants have 
moved from only recognizing various cognitions in others to consistently making reasonable 
inferences about cognition and affect.  
Improvement in Mastery from a mean score of 4.65 to 5.33 reflects that in addition to 
active or selected avoidance or simply relying on others, individuals regularly implement 
specific behavioral strategies (i.e., refraining from raising one’s voice in an anger provoking 
situation and forcing oneself to listen; Lysaker, Buck, et al., 2015) and are beginning to respond 
to psychological problems by changing the way in which they think about them (Lysaker, Buck, 
et al., 2015). Again, for SMI populations in general and personality disordered individuals 
specifically known for their rigidity and inflexibility, these seemingly small differences likely 
reflect substantial clinical progress, results that are consistent with previous studies indicating 
positive outcomes for long-term psychoanalytic psychotherapy for persons with SMI and with 
personality disorders in particular (Bateman & Fonagy, 2008; Chiesa, Fonagy, & Holmes, 2003; 
Clarkin et al., 2007; de Maat, de Jonghe, Schoevers, & Dekker, 2009; Leichsenring & Leibing, 
2003; Leichsenring & Rabung, 2008; Levy et al., 2006; Messer & Abbass, in press; Shedler, 
2010).   
With regard to our hypotheses that our groups would display different metacognitive 
profiles, these hypotheses were not supported at the level of clinical significance. Differences in 
mean metacognitive scores and degrees of change of those scores over time were negligible 
across the three groups. This was contrary to findings in our pilot study (Neal et al., 2017), which 
revealed statistically significant group differences (F1,7 = 12.15; p = .01) and very large effect 
sizes (Cohen’s d = 2.65) between NPD and BPD in terms of Mastery. However, similar to our 
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pilot study (Neal et al., 2017), differences were noted amongst effect sizes of metacognitive 
scores across occasions when computed for each group individually (Table 6). In terms of Self-
Reflectivity, large effect sizes were noted for the BPD group (d = 0.81) and the SPD group (d = 
0.87), but only small effect sizes were noted for the NPD group (d = 0.37), suggesting SPD and 
BPD groups improve in their capacity for self-reflection in response to treatment at a greater rate 
than do NPD patients. With regard to the category of Awareness of Others, while moderate effect 
sizes were noted for both the BPD and SPD groups, no change (effect size of d = 0.00) was 
found for the NPD group, suggesting treatment had no effect—whether due to a neurocognitive 
deficit or a lack of desire—for this group to improve their capacity to think about the thinking of 
others.  
On the other hand, the NPD group had the highest effect size for changes in the category 
of Decentration (d = 0.87), while effect sizes for the BPD group (d = 0.49) and the SPD group 
(d=0.54) were relatively moderate. This was unexpected. However, when looking at the mean 
scores for Decentration from Occasion one (M = 1.25) to Occasion two (M = 1.38) for the NPD 
group, clinical significance of such differences appears to be negligible. What is more interesting 
is the lack of clinically significant change—despite statistically significant change—for the 
sample as a whole in the category of Decentration. If these findings accurately represent this 
population, they may suggest high-acuity mental illness, with myriad symptoms and profound 
levels of dysfunction, is inherently self-absorbing. Alternatively, self-absorption and problems 
with perspective taking may exist as core symptoms for personality disorders in general, or each 
of these disorders specifically. In retrospect, a good hypothesis we did not include would have 
been that SPD groups would be worse than BPD groups in the metacognitive category of 
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decentration, but not worse than NPD groups. Though all personality disorders manifest with 
elements of narcissism, it makes sense that detachment from the world and a lack of desire for 
connections with others would appear phenomenologically similar to the self-absorption 
commonly found in NPD and the preoccupation with issues of attachment and individuation 
found in BPD. In each scenario, there is a self-focus that limits perspective taking. See also 
Akhtar (1987, p. 505) for similar overlap between the “contact shunning” disorders NPD and 
SPD observed by Kohut (1971). 
In terms of Mastery, the NPD group exhibited the greatest change and a large effect size 
(Cohen’s d = 1.18), with close to a large effect size also for the SPD group (d = 0.75) and a 
moderate effect size for the BPD group (d = 0.54). This is in line with our hypothesis that NPD 
patients would be better able to make use of psychotherapy in the service of Mastery than would 
BPD patients, and in line with other studies (Outcalt et al., 2015) showing Mastery deficits in 
BPD samples, including our pilot study (Neal et al., 2017). This effect could occur for a variety 
of reasons, one of the most compelling of which is Fonagy et al.’s (2015) theory on epistemic 
trust, which suggests that in BPD patients, trust is undermined to such a degree that learning 
from others becomes nearly impossible.  
Effect sizes for treatment of patients with personality disorders at the ARC are within the 
range of treatment effect sizes reported by Lambert, Weber, and Sykes (1993); they reported an 
average therapy effect size of d = 0.82. In general, the results of this study are promising in that 
they support a growing consensus that psychoanalytic treatment of SMI is appropriate, and that 
measurable metacognitive improvements can be found in response to a psychoanalytic 
psychotherapy intervention (Shedler, 2010). However, given the complexity of the patient 
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population at ARC, as well as the uniqueness of the treatment milieu, these results have limited 
generalizability. Additionally, while effect size differences between groups do suggest that there 
may be unique metacognitive profiles for different personality disorders, further research is 
needed to better determine the veracity of these findings.   
Limitations 
 There are multiple limitations of this study. First, the size of our NPD sample within the 
FAS database was small. In order to test our hypotheses, the same individuals selected in the 
original pilot study (Neal et al., 2017) were reassessed. However, this did not seem to affect our 
statistics, as those 4 individuals were compared to a larger sample of BPD individuals and a 
group of SPD individuals, entirely different comparison groups from the first study. Second, this 
study is limited by the inherent complexity of personality disorder diagnosis.  While our patients 
met criteria for DSM-IV (APA, 1994) personality diagnoses, important criticisms have 
highlighted multiple flaws with this diagnostic system, limiting the validity of these diagnostic 
categories (see Chapter 1 – Introduction, p. 4; Skodol et al., 2011; Bateman et al., 2018). 
Furthermore, at least three within our sample met criteria for both BPD and SPD, suggesting that 
the groupings to which our participants have been assigned may have been less than ideal. 
Similarly, Charles (2018, personal communication) has noted that in her clinical work with SMI 
populations and in reading FAS transcripts, she believes NPD individuals often appear 
“borderline” when decompensated, thus creating a BPD population that appears more 
heterogenous than it would be if these two groups could be appropriately sorted. Statistical 
similarities for the groups are therefore not surprising, as personality group differences may be 
obscured for numerous reasons.  
METACOGNITIVE CHANGES 67 
 
 
 Third, the overall complexity of the patients at ARC and of our sample population makes 
it difficult to control for confounding factors such as medical conditions, disabilities, substance 
use, psychosis, and any number of a variety of other diagnoses that may have influenced 
metacognitive ability and made direct PD comparisons difficult.  
 Fourth, this study was limited by the fact that our transcripts, derived from the Dynamic 
Interview, were not designed to be used with Lysaker, Buck, et al.’s (2015) MAS-a scale, as was 
the IPII. The Dynamic Interview has different question prompts, and the questions asked varied 
amongst interviewers throughout the interviews. Spontaneously generated examples of 
metacognitive functioning may have been limited or enhanced by the questions asked as well as 
by the style of the interviewer. Unfortunately, this was a limitation of our archival study design, 
using a measure of assessment that did not exist when the interviews were originally recorded. 
The results of our MAS-a scores are therefore not entirely comparable to other studies using the 
MAS-a. 
 Fifth, compared to other populations with similar levels of SMI such as the samples 
derived from the VA population in many of Lysaker’s studies, patients at ARC are 
disproportionately wealthy and well-educated. While patients at ARC often experience feelings 
of shame and guilt because they fail despite such resources and also display similar levels of 
impoverished metacognition (Charles, 2018, personal communication), such stark socio-
economic differences nevertheless pose obstacles in comparing our results to other similarly 
studied samples.  
 Sixth, the decentration scale has a limited range (0-3) compared to the other scales in the 
MAS-a (0-9 for Self-reflectivity, 0-7 for Awareness of others, and 0-9 for Mastery). With such a 
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limited range and only several markers determining the various levels of metacognitive 
sophistication in this category, metacognitive growth in terms of decentration may be under- or 
overestimated when compared to change in other scales.  
 Seventh, one major flaw of the study was that while both MAS-a coders were blind to 
personality group, one MAS-a coder was aware of which transcripts represented occasion one vs. 
occasion two. Thus, with regard to differences over time, our study was only half-blind. Despite 
the fact that the MAS-a provides rather concrete scoring metrics and that scores between both 
coders were similar, a lack of complete blindness to time increases the likelihood that 
investigator bias may have played a role in determining the results of the study. 
Lastly, this study was limited due to the fact that even though all received treatment at 
ARC, study participants were exposed to different therapists, different durations of therapy, and 
different psychiatric medication regimens. The durations between occasion 1 and occasion 2 
were also not entirely uniform, though attempts were made to score the initial and first follow-up 
transcript when possible. Results may have been different with a more controlled study.  
Future Directions 
Additional research is needed to more adequately answer our question of whether 
different personality disorders have unique metacognitive deficits. Future studies would benefit 
from greater control over diagnostic variables, more consistency between the administration style 
of the interviews, exposure to treatment and duration between interviews, and more open ended 
interview questions (using the IPII Interview instead of the Dynamic Interview according to 
guidelines in Lysaker, Buck, et al., 2015). While our sample was racially homogenous, age, sex, 
and race may be important covariates to consider in future studies.  




Despite the limitations of this study, our sample as a whole does seem to be 
representative of the general population at ARC. Our results suggest no statistically significant 
differences between groups, but statistically and clinically significant improvements in 
metacognitive functioning—or insight—in the SMI sample as a whole following at least six 
months of psychoanalytic psychotherapy in a psychiatric hospital setting. Effect sizes were 
moderate for each of the metacognitive domains—Self-reflectivity, Awareness of others, 
Decentration, and Mastery—and large for Total metacognitive scores. These effect sizes are 
similar to those found in meta-analyses of psychotherapy outcomes (e.g., Barber et al., 2013; 
Lambert, 2013; Leichensenring et al., 2013) and are generally consistent with Shedler’s (2010) 
report regarding the efficacy of psychodynamic psychotherapy. 
In general, this study adds to the evidence-base in support of psychoanalytic 
psychotherapy for SMI populations and highlights the effectiveness of a unique assessment 
instrument—the MAS-a—for measuring metacognitive change in a sample with complex mental 
illness. While this study did not find personality diagnosis to be a statistically significant 
mediator of metacognition and of metacognitive change over time, noticeable differences in 
effect sizes between personality groups over time may suggest important differences might be 
found with a larger study. Such differences may help us better understand the psychopathology 
of personality disorders and adjust treatment based on the unique metacognitive needs of the 
patient.  




 For several reasons, completing this dissertation was a transformative experience for me. 
For one, my knowledge of both metacognition and the implications of metacognitive impairment 
in SMI populations has grown extensively. So too has my understanding of the important and 
nuanced ways that different diagnoses—schizophrenia-spectrum, mood disorders, personality 
disorders—vary in terms of metacognitive capacity and in terms of the etiology of their 
metacognitive limitations. This project has also improved my ability to assess metacognitive 
limitations in real time and to work therapeutically with individuals at a more appropriate level 
of metacognitive ability. This has practical significance in terms of increasing the effectiveness 
of my therapeutic approach, but it also helps me feel better about the work I do with individuals 
who have a lower level of metacognitive functioning. Working with such individuals can be 
difficult and disorienting, and it can often be much harder to notice progress or improvement in 
therapy than it is with higher functioning individuals. Learning the MAS-a has given me a 
framework for understanding metacognitive growth as a developmental process, and with that in 
mind, noticing even small developmental steps a patient might take—such as recognizing a 
thought or an emotion—can be immensely rewarding. 
 Lastly, I have come to understand that one’s capacity for doubt is a developmental 
milestone (see level 5 of the Self-reflectivity scale). Early in my own faith journey, a need for 
certainty about the nature of God and about my own identity in a vast universe constricted my 
psychological and spiritual growth. In needing things to be a certain way, I had an impaired 
ability to see and to make sense of the way that things actually were. This led to a truncated life 
experience guided by a fear of not knowing and a fear of knowing wrongly. Only when I was 
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able to be honest about my own doubt—about my capabilities, about my faith, my sense of 
morality, and about my identity—did I begin to grow emotionally, psychologically, and 
spiritually.  
Certainty seems to mitigate anxiety, but only on one level of our being, and only for a 
time. In grasping for certainty, something terrifying about the world—that we do not really 
know—is pushed just out of our awareness. We turn a blind eye and trade painful truths for a 
perpetual fear of un-knowing that which on some level of our being, we must already know.  
Holding in mind doubt as a developmental milestone reminds me to embrace uncertainty at every 
corner. Embrace doubt, not as a counterpoint to faith, but as a way to tether oneself to reality. 
Doubt is an antidote not to faith but to self-deception; it is a stepping stone to a greater ability to 
think meaningfully about our own thoughts and our experiences in the world.  
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Dissertation: Metacognitive changes in individuals with severe mental illness in response to 
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ABPP;  Nancy Thurston, PsyD, ABPP 
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Student Therapist 
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orientation 
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  Cardio-Thoracic Intensive Care Unit 
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• Facilitated delivery of quality nursing care, met the needs of nursing 
staff, and coordinated activity within 15-bed ICU as charge nurse 
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care 
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Research Doctoral Dissertation 
Experience Dissertation: Metacognitive changes in individuals with severe mental illness in response to 
psychoanalytic psychotherapy 
Preliminary Proposal Defense: Full Pass, May,12th, 2017 
  Current Status: Data collection 
  Dissertation Defense: Expected by April, 2018 
  Dissertation committee: Rodger Bufford, PhD; Marilyn Charles,  
PhD, ABPP; Nancy Thurston, PsyD, ABPP 
 
  Research Vertical Team Member 
• Collaborate and design various research projects with team members 
Formal presentations of research projects and results 




Presentations Neal, D., Bufford, R., Stricklen, J., Nalbandian, R., Charles, M., & Thurston, N. (2017, 
April). Metacognitive outcomes of psychodynamic therapy for severe and persistent mental 
illness. Poster session presented at the 2017 American Psychological Association Division 
(39) of Psychoanalysis Annual Conference, New York, NY.  
 
Presentations 
Charles, M. & Neal, D. (2018-anticipated). 20,000 Leagues under the sea: a deep dive into 
the personality of the complex psychiatric patient. Integrated paper session submission 
accepted for the 2018 Annual Society of Personality Assessment Convention, Washington, 
D.C., March 2018 
 
Charles, M., Dodd, Z., & Neal, D. (2018-anticipated). Trauma, truth, and representation: Art 
and the consulting room. Panel session submission under review for the 2018 American 
Psychological Association Division (39) of Psychoanalysis Annual Conference, New 
Orleans, LA. 
 
Captari, L., Pace, A., Neal, D., McDermott, H., Hansen, M., Guevara, C. (2017, April). From 
the couch to the community: Exploring diverse and culturally relevant applications of 
psychoanalysis. Panel presentation at the 2017 American Psychological Association 
Division (39) of Psychoanalysis Annual Conference, New York, NY. 
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Andrews, G., Neal, D., Leoncé, C., & Seiders, J. (2016, August). Cognition, memory, and 
behavior of sibling groups with FASD: Nature and Nurture. Symposium presentation at the 
2016 American Psychological Association Annual Convention, Denver, CO. 
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  Awards  Scholar – Division 39 (Psychoanalysis) of the American Psychological Association  
        2017 
• Given to graduate students and early career psychologists who 
demonstrate interest and promise as psychoanalytic practitioners. 
Scholars are provided mentorship from a senior psychoanalyst, given a 
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resources in furthering their psychoanalytic education.  
  
Special Academic Commendation     2017 
George Fox University Graduate Department of Clinical Psychology 
• Award for outstanding academic, clinical, and professional contributions 
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• Psychoanalytic reading group – Friends of Freud 
• Psychoanalytic Student Interest Group    2016-Current 
 
Student Member        
• American Psychological Association    2014-Current 
• APA Division 39 (Psychoanalysis)    2016-Current 
• International Society for Psychological   2016-Current 
and Social Approaches to Psychosis  
• Neuroscience Education Institute     2016-2017 
• APA Division 53 (Child and Adolescent Psychology) 2015-2016 
 
Participant        2009-2011 
Critical Care Medicine Leadership Training 
Children’s Hospital Los Angeles 
 
 
Clinical Team        2014-Current 
• Consultation group that meets weekly to present and discuss cases from 
various clinical perspectives 
• Supervisors: Carlos Taloyo, PhD; Nancy Thurston, PsyD, ABPP; Paul 
Stolzfus, PsyD; Kris Kays, PsyD 
 
Steif, B., Jenkins, S., & Rodriguez, A. (2017). Black psychoanalysts speak. Screening and 
panel discussion at Oregon Psychoanalytic Center. Portland, OR. 
 
Knafo, D. (2017). Psychosis: Key psychoanalytic concepts. Webinar presentation via The 




Bartlett, R. (2017, Oct). Listening for unconscious communications. Presented at George 
Fox University, Psychoanalytic Student Interest Group. Newberg, OR. 
 
Aron, L., Churchill, H., DeVinney, H., Hedlund, S., Lugar, S., & Rubin, B. (2017, April). 
Striking when the iron’s cold? Exploring the how, when, if, and why of pursuing 
psychoanalytic training. Continuing education master class at Division of Psychoanalysis 
(39) 37th Annual Spring Meeting. New York, NY. 
 
 
White, C. (2017, April). A conversation with Cleonie White, PhD. Special workshop for 
graduate students at Division of Psychoanalysis (39) 37th Annual Spring Meeting. New York, 
NY. 
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Presentation presented at George Fox University, Graduate Department of Clinical 
Psychology Spring Diversity Grand Rounds, Newberg, OR.   
	
Warford, P. & Baltzell, T. (2017, March). Domestic violence: a coordinated community 
response. Presentation presented at George Fox University, Graduate Department of 
Clinical Psychology Spring Colloquium, Newberg, OR. 
 
Brown, S. (2017, Feb). Native self-actualization: it’s assessment and application in therapy. 
Presentation at George Fox University, Graduate Department of Clinical Psychology Spring 
Grand Rounds, Newberg, OR.	
    
George Fox University Behavioral Health Bootcamp   2016 
Newberg, OR 
• Multi-day training to prepare professionals and students to work in 
Integrated Care/Behavioral Health. 
• Topics: Common Diagnoses, Diversity, Motivational Interviewing, and 
Evidence-Based Interventions for Integrated Care. 
 
Summer Intensive Rorschach Training Workshop   2016 
Nancy Thurston, PsyD, ABPP, Certified Analyst 
 
Bourg, W. (2016, Nov). When divorce hits the family: helping parents and children navigate. 
Presentation presented at George Fox University, Graduate Department of Clinical 
Psychology Fall Grand Rounds, Newberg, OR.   
 
Frawley-O’Dea, M.G. (2016) Transference/countertransference paradigms in clinical work. 
Presentation at Brookhaven Institute for Psychoanalysis and Christian Theology. Fogelsville, 
PA. 
 
Kuhnhausen, B. (2016, Oct). Sacredness, naming, and healing: Lanterns along the way. 
Presentation presented at George Fox University, Graduate Department of Clinical 
Psychology Fall Colloquium, Newberg, OR.   
 
McWilliams, N. (2016). What remains of value to therapists in the work of Sigmund Freud? 
Presentation at Brookhaven Institute for Psychoanalysis and Christian Theology. Fogelsville, 
PA.  
 
Charles, M. (2016). Object relations. Presentation at Brookhaven Institute for 
Psychoanalysis and Christian Theology. Fogelsville, PA 
 
Altman, N. (2016). Race, class, culture in psychotherapy. Presentation at the Oregon 
Psychoanalytic Center. Portland, OR.  
 
Jenkins, S. (2016, Mar.). Managing with diverse clients. Presentation presented at George 






Fox University, Graduate Department of Clinical Psychology Spring Colloquium, Newberg, 
OR.  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